Objective and Unconditioned Value
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10695977 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Rae Langton (autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2007 |
| Volume | 116 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 157-185 |
| Data de publicação | 2007-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Editora | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-2006-034 |
| OpenAlex | W2128927091 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 51 |
Research Article| April 01 2007 Objective and Unconditioned Value Rae Langton Rae Langton Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 157–185. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-034 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Rae Langton; Objective and Unconditioned Value. The Philosophical Review 1 April 2007; 116 (2): 157–185. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-034 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search Cornell University2007 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal Issue Section: Front Matter You do not currently have access to this content
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Injustice, relational violence, and the foster system
Indirect evaluative voluntarism
The “Intrinsic” Bit
Axiology and Time
Idealization
A Defense of Subjectivism
Temporal Neutrality and The Demandingness of Prudence
Deontic and Maximizing
The “Prudential” Bit
The Possibility of Temporal Bias
Scoreism and the Constitution of Prudential Reasons
The Valuing Attitude
Project-Oriented Subjectivism
What Is a Theory of Prudential Intrinsic Value?
Sexual solipsism
Kant's Grounded Cosmopolitanism
Xunzi’s Metaethics
Autonomy‐Denial in Objectification
Must We Be Just Plain Good? On Regress Arguments for the Value of Humanity
Kant’s Solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma
Kant's Conception of Inner Value
Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist
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Innate right in Kant—A critical reading
A forgotten distinction in value theory
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Schopenhauer on the content of compassion
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Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing
Kant on Autonomy and the Value of Persons
Practical Reason and Respect for Persons
Kant’s Idealism on a Moderate Interpretation
The Value of Practical Knowledge
Games and the Good Life
Meriting Concern and Meriting Respect
Educational Justice and the Value of Excellence
Précis of Moral Reason
The value of minimalist truth
Aesthetic sense and social cognition
Constructing Universities for Democracy
Korsgaard's Arguments for the Value of Humanity
Rights and the Good
Morality, Uncertainty
A Reconstruction of Korsgaard on Autonomy’s Objective Value in Light of Sangiovanni, Guyer, and Langton
The Moral Law as a Fact of Reason and Correctness Conditions for the Moral Law
The Unity of the Moral Domain
Teoria do valor
Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1)
How to Value Equality
| Obras citantes distintas | 51 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 3 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2009 - 2025 (17) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 48 |