A Reconstruction of Korsgaard on Autonomy’s Objective Value in Light of Sangiovanni, Guyer, and Langton

Christine Korsgaard avers that the value we place on specific personal choices — understood as goals or ends — involves committing to them, or forming a care, which is itself conditioned by the value-conferring ability of the valuer. In other words, personal autonomy implies the objective value of the agent’s autonomous choosing and their coeval cares projects. Commentators like Andrea Sangiovanni, Paul Guyer, and Rae Langton criticize Korsgaard’s commitment-based conception of autonomous choosing. This article reviews these objections and then proposes a modified Korsgaardian framework concerning the objective value of autonomous choosing, which, I propose, avoids these critical objections

Aesthetics · Autonomy · Political science · Psychoanalysis · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

• Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics

  Open Access•Marcus Willaschek•Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics•2018

  Incluir item

• Critique of Pure Reason

  Open Access•Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer et al.•Critique of Pure Reason•1998

  Incluir item

• Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics

  Open Access•Onora O’neill, Onora O'Neill•Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics•2002

  Incluir item

• Paternalism

  Gerald Dworkin, Sherwood J B Sugden•The Monist•1972

  Incluir item

• Against Autonomy

  E Fuller Torrey, Jeffrey L Geller•Psychiatric Services•2013

  Incluir item

• Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves

  Open Access•Jolley Christman, John Christman•Philosophical Studies•2004

  Incluir item

• Personal Autonomy and Society

  Open Access•Marina Oshana, Marina A L Oshana•Journal of Social Philosophy•1998

  Incluir item

• Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness

  Open Access•Paul Guyer•Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness•2000

  Incluir item

• Skepticism about Practical Reason

  Christine M Korsgaard•The Journal of Philosophy•1986

  Incluir item

• Creating the Kingdom of Ends

  Open Access•Christine M Korsgaard•Creating the Kingdom of Ends•1996

  Incluir item

• Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism

  Open Access•Catriona Mackenzie•Journal of Social Philosophy•2008

  Incluir item

• Morality and identity

  Open Access•Raymond Geuss•Sources of Normativity•1996

  Incluir item

• Humanity without Dignity

  Andrea Sangiovanni•Humanity Without Dignity•2017

  Incluir item

• The Sources of Normativity

  Open Access•Christine M Korsgaard, Onora O’neill et al.•Sources of Normativity•1996

  Incluir item

• Rethinking Relational Autonomy

  Open Access•Andrea C Westlund•Hypatia•2009

  Incluir item

• Agency, Shmagency

  Dan Enoch, David Enoch•The Philosophical Review•2006

  Incluir item

• Two Distinctions in Goodness

  Christine M Korsgaard•The Philosophical Review•1983

  Incluir item

• Objective and Unconditioned Value

  Rae Langton•The Philosophical Review•2007

  Incluir item

• Self-Constitution

  Christine M Korsgaard•Self-constitution•2009

  Incluir item