Pro-growth inefficiency
Rents and moral hazard in infrastructure contests in China
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21470795 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Qijun Liu (0000-0002-3693-3270, Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Xin Huang (0009-0007-5355-1008, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2024 |
| Volume | 84 |
| Páginas | 102397 |
| Data de publicação | 2024-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | European Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0176-2680 • E-ISSN: 1873-5703 |
| Editora | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102397 |
| OpenAlex | W4365812667 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 3 |
| Referências citadas | 40 |
Bankruptcy · Business · China · CONTEST · Debt · Economic rent · Economics · Incentive · Inefficiency · Language change · Local government · Market economy · Moral hazard · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Rent-seeking · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Public Administration · Finance
Strategy and Dynamics in Contests
Causes of corruption
The institutional environment for infrastructure investment
China's transition to markets
Contribution to productivity or pork barrel? The two faces of infrastructure investment
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
Relative performance evaluation and the turnover of provincial leaders in China
Is public expenditure productive?
Political turnover and economic performance
The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development
The effects of federal regulations on corruption in U.S. States
Perception vs. experience
Career incentives of local leaders and crisis response
Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking
Governance regimes, corruption and growth
Corruption and economic growth
Using Heteroscedasticity to Identify and Estimate Mismeasured and Endogenous Regressor Models
Rent seeking and the economics of corruption
Beyond the efficiency‐equity dilemma
Who takes bribes and how much? Evidence from the China Corruption Conviction Databank
The Contribution of Local Public Infrastructure to Private Productivity and its Political Economy
The determinants of cross-border corruption
Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests
The Law of China's Local Government Debt
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,5 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 3 |