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Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9705622
AutoresMark Gradstein (Ben Gurion University), Kai A Konrad (0000-0002-2225-2271, Freie Universität Berlin)
Ano1999
Volume109
Fascículo458
Páginas536-545
Data de publicação1999-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1468-0297.00461
OpenAlexW2135827245
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas31
Referências citadas10

Contests have different, sometimes quite complex, organisational structures. In particular, while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests, multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered. This paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure, which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

CONTEST · Economics · Industrial organization · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Rent-seeking · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law

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Obras citantes distintas31
Citações por ano1,19
Intervalo de citações2000 - 2024 (25)
Velocidade de citaçãorecent
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 31
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