Optimal Lottery Design for Public Financing

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9720099
AutoresAkira Maeda (0000-0001-7334-5438, Kyoto University, autor correspondente)
Ano2008
Volume118
Fascículo532
Páginas1698-1718
Data de publicação2008-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02186.x
OpenAlexW1981979041
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas26

This article develops a model of optimal lottery design for public financing, on the assumption that economic agents view buying lottery tickets as a form of entertainment. Given that lotteries are optimally designed, it offers two findings: (1) the fundraising potential of a lottery is independent of its type (specifically, of whether it is a fixed-prize type or a pari mutuel); and (2) the ratio of the optimal winning prize amount in each prize class to total lottery sales is equalised to the elasticity of demand for lottery ticket purchases with respect to the winning prize in each prize class. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008

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