How Does Human Agency Actually Work? On Bratman's ‘Core Capacity Thesis’ and the Relation between Philosophy of Action and the Empirical Sciences
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21497527 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jonathan Phillips (0000-0002-3073-1045, Dartmouth College), Dudley Plunkett (0000-0003-1293-5770, Dartmouth College Hanover NH USA, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2024 |
| Volume | 41 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 16-29 |
| Data de publicação | 2024-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Applied Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0264-3758 • E-ISSN: 1468-5930 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/japp.12710 |
| OpenAlex | W4391151487 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 2 |
| Referências citadas | 20 |
Throughout his career, Michael Bratman has developed a detailed model of individual ‘planning agency’, and, more recently, models of joint action and aspects of social life that he argues such planning agency helps support. How might we empirically investigate whether these models capture what is going on in actual human lives? In this article, we critically engage with this broad question by focusing on what Bratman calls the ‘core capacity thesis’, which is at the center of his most recent discussions of how his work in the philosophy of action hangs together. In his own words, the core capacity thesis claims that ‘our capacity for planning agency plays basic roles in multiple, interrelated systems of human, mind‐shaped practical organization, individual and social’. We explore how one might go about testing this thesis, focusing on Bratman's particular way of defending this thesis using the idea of ‘nested Cummins functions’. In so doing, we hope to contribute to a broader discussion about what the relationship is (or, perhaps more importantly, should be) between the kind of philosophy of action Bratman does and empirical work in fields such as psychology, cognitive science, and biology
Epistemology · Sociology · Complex Systems and Decision Making · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy
Shared and Institutional Agency
Shared Agency
Legality
Functional Analysis
Understanding and sharing intentions
Faces of Intention
Planning and Its Function in Our Lives
Functionalisms and the Philosophy of Action
Planning in young children
A Natural History of Human Morality
Functions
Planning ahead
Structures of Agency
Philosophy of Action
Self-Constitution
Risk, Responsibility, and Blame
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 2 |