Intention as practical memory and the tasks of action theory
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21501759 |
|---|---|
| Autores | M Kelley (0000-0001-5131-0525, Department of Philosophy University of Chicago Chicago Illinois USA, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2026 |
| Volume | 41 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 425-431 |
| Data de publicação | 2026-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.70052 |
| OpenAlex | W7164330915 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 10 |
In this paper, I raise two challenges to Wayne Wu's proposal that intentions are practical memories. The first questions whether practical memories possess the functional roles that Michael Bratman's influential planning theory identifies for intention. The second suggests that a conception of intention as practical memory obscures the logic of intention in our ordinary ethical thought and talk. Both challenges are grounded in methodological reflections on the sources of disagreement in the philosophy of action
Grounded theory · Philosophy of mind · Theory of mind · Environmental Philosophy and Ethics · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |