Conceptual recombination and stimulus-independence in non-human animals

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21549485
AutoresLaura Danón (0000-0003-2618-8948, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume37
Fascículo3
Páginas309-330
Data de publicação2022-12-04
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoTHEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0495-4548 • E-ISSN: 2171-679X
EditoraEHU Press (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1387/theoria.23638
OpenAlexW4316037526
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas14

Camp (2009) distinguishes two varieties of conceptual recombination. One of them is full-blown or (as I prefer to call it) spontaneous recombination. The other is causal-counterfactual recombination. She suggests that while human animals recombine their concepts in a full-blown way, many non-human animals are capable of conceptual recombinability but only of the causal-counterfactual kind. In this paper, I argue that there is conceptual space to draw further sub-distinctions on how different animals may recombine their concepts. More specifically, I propose to differentiate between a) narrow causal-counterfactual recombination; b) broad causal-counterfactual recombination; c) lean spontaneous recombination; d) robust spontaneous recombination. Afterwards, I focus on how these distinctions relate to several previous philosophical ideas on the representational capacities of non-human animals. I also provide several empirical examples suggesting that some animals display one or another of these four ways of recombining concepts, at least in some contexts

Biology · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Epistemology · Recombination · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology · Genetics