Are Humans the Only Rational Animals
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 4351908 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Giacomo Melis (0009-0006-9084-884X, University of Stirling), Susana Monsó (0000-0002-1450-8089, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna) |
| Ano | 2024 |
| Volume | 74 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 844-864 |
| Data de publicação | 2024-06-05 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqad090 |
| OpenAlex | W4386946743 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 13 |
| Referências citadas | 74 |
While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals
Cognitive science · Empirical evidence · Epistemology · Focus (optics · Non-human · Rationality · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
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Young children’s understanding of denial
Metacognition and cognitive monitoring
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| Obras citantes distintas | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 6,5 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 13 |