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Are Humans the Only Rational Animals

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4351908
AutoresGiacomo Melis (0009-0006-9084-884X, University of Stirling), Susana Monsó (0000-0002-1450-8089, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna)
Ano2024
Volume74
Fascículo3
Páginas844-864
Data de publicação2024-06-05
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqad090
OpenAlexW4386946743
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas13
Referências citadas74

While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals

Cognitive science · Empirical evidence · Epistemology · Focus (optics · Non-human · Rationality · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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    Open Access•Kristen Cudmore, Cassandra Hanrahan•Human-Animal Interactions•2025

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    Open Access•Giacomo Melis•Critica•2026

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    Open Access•Giacomo Melis, Kirsten H Blakey•Erkenntnis•2026

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Obras citantes distintas13
Citações por ano6,5
Intervalo de citações2024 - 2026 (3)
Velocidade de citaçãocurrent
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 13
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