Reconsidering commonsense consent

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21591999
AutoresHanna Kim (0000-0001-7503-924X, Philosophy Department, Washington & Jefferson College, Washington, PA, USA, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume38
Fascículo2
Páginas397-435
Data de publicação2025-02-17
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2023.2224386
OpenAlexW4381853724
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas41

In the 2020 Yale Law Journal article, “Commonsense Consent,” Roseanna Sommers argues that deception is compatible with the layperson’s intuitive sense of consent. That is, unlike the canonical understanding of consent defended by legal scholars and philosophers, the notion of consent defended by the folk is not invalidated by deception. In this study, I find that while respondents do appear to attribute consent to victims of deception, they do so in a limited number of contexts – i.e., they attribute de re consent to victims of de dicto deception and attribute de dicto consent to victims of de re deception. When the two varieties of consent and deception are properly disambiguated and matched type for type however, we see the reverse phenomenon – i.e., participants refrain from attributing de dicto consent to de dicto deception and refrain from attributing de re consent to de re deception. If this is right, rather than saying, as Sommers does, that deception generally fails to invalidate commonsense consent, we should refine our understanding of commonsense consent to include two varieties of consent, each of which is in fact invalidated by its own variety of deception

Alternative medicine · Deception · Epistemology · Informed consent · Deception detection and forensic psychology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Medicine · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology