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Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American Preference for Short, Framework-Oriented Constitutions

Dados Bibliográficos

ID3521359
AutoresChristopher W Hammons (Houston Christian University, autor correspondente)
Ano1999
Volume93
Fascículo4
Páginas837-849
Data de publicação1999-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2586116
OpenAlexW2070323178
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas15
Referências citadas17

American constitutional thought has long held that short, framework-oriented constitutions last longer than lengthy, statute-oriented constitutions. The longevity of the U.S. Constitution contributes heavily to this assumption. Not surprisingly, political scientists criticize state constitutions for their greater length and tendency to address issues better dealt with through ordinary statute law. These "defects" are frequently cited as responsible for the shorter lifespan of state constitutions. An examination of the 145 constitutions used by the American states since 1776, however, reveals a relationship among content, length, and durability that refutes the assumption that the design of the national constitution is necessarily superior. To the contrary, the analysis here reveals that longer and more detailed design of state constitutions actually enhances rather than reduces their longevity

Constitution · Economics · Law and economics · Longevity · Political science · Politics · Preference · Sociology · State (computer science · Statute · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Mathematics

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Obras citantes distintas15
Citações por ano0,6
Intervalo de citações2001 - 2025 (25)
Velocidade de citaçãorecent
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 14
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