Deterrence Research
Past Progress and Future Needs
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 3917022 |
|---|---|
| Autores | John R Raser (Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1966 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 297-327 |
| Data de publicação | 1966-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234336600300401 |
| OpenAlex | W1995967821 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 5 |
| Referências citadas | 78 |
Computer security · Criminology · Deterrence (psychology) · Forensic engineering · Injury prevention · Medical emergency · Occupational safety and health · Poison control · Suicide prevention · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Engineering · Human Factors and Ergonomics · Information and Cyber Security · Medicine · Psychology
Bargaining and group decision making
The theory of political coalitions.
How nations see each other
The Common Defense
Varieties of human value.
Strategy in the Missile Age
Discord and Collaboration
Learning theory and behavior.
The Bargaining Problem
Some informational aspects of visual perception.
The Operational Code of the Politburo
System and process in international politics
Power and Policy
Foreign Policy Decision Making
Bargaining, communication, and limited war
Fights, Games, and Debates
Ideology and Utopia
Cognitive Rigidity as a Function of Threat1
Models of Man
Dynamics of International Relations
International Behavior
The Mirror Image in Soviet‐American Relations
Some Considerations Relevant to National Policy
Anxiety, Threat, and Defensive Reactions
Kill and Overkill. The Strategy of Annihilation
Leadership in Communist China
Strategy and Arms Control
Alliance Policy in the Cold War
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy
Group Integration during a Crisis
Bargaining behavior. I. "Prominence" as a predictor of the outcome of games of agreement
The International Consequences of Expecting Surprise
Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence
Nuclear Tactics for Defending a Border
Experimental Games and Bargaining Theory
The Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence
From Balance to Deterrence
Peking's Military Calculus
The Anatomy of Deterrence
Some Assessments and Uses of Public Opinion in Diplomacy
An analysis of responsiveness between nations
Some systemic effects of the spread of nuclear weapons technology
The calculus of deterrence
On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games
The belief system and national images
Political negotiation as a process of modifying utilities
More calculations about deterrence
Suggestions for winning the real war with communism
Induced collaboration in some non-zero-sum games
The conflict intersystem and the change agent
Threat-perception and the armament-tension dilemma
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
Visual Search for Successive Decisions
An Experimental Study of Coalitions in the Triad
East-West Interaction Patterns
Social Pressures in Informal Groups
A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad
The effects of threat and frustration on group cohesiveness
Leadership in Communist China
Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age
Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack
Tensions Affecting International Understanding
Learning and Affect i n iNternational Politics
The Delicate Balance of Terror
Missiles and the Western Alliance
| Obras citantes distintas | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,09 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1971 - 2010 (40) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 4 |