Another Argument Against Uniqueness

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4351879
AutoresT Raleigh (0000-0001-5056-0039, autor correspondente)
Ano2016
Páginaspqw058
Data de publicação2016-09-12
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqw058
OpenAlexW2520869386
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas12
Referências citadas20

I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle: (roughly stated) If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle – viz. opposition to ‘epistemic consequentialism’ – is briefly discussed. The principle is extended to cover degrees of belief and compared with a couple of other well-known constraints on rational degrees of belief.

Argument (complex analysis) · Consequentialism · Counterexample · Discrete mathematics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Proposition · Subject (documents) · Uniqueness · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil