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A Puzzle about withholding

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4885043
AutoresJohn Turri (0000-0001-7611-2824, University of Waterloo, autor correspondente)
Ano2012
Volume62
Fascículo247
Páginas355-364
Data de publicação2012-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00043.x
OpenAlexW1982835799
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas16

This paper presents a puzzle about justification and withholding. The puzzle arises in a special case where experts advise us to not withhold judgment. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is genuinely a puzzle, and so leads us to rethink some common assumptions in epistemology, specifically assumptions about the nature of justification and doxastic attitudes. Section 1 introduces the common assumptions. Section 2 presents the puzzle case. Section 3 assesses the puzzle case. Section 4 explains the choice we're faced with. Sections 5 and 6 consider and reject some proposed solutions, and in the process refine and clarify the choice we're faced with. Section 7 considers and rejects a miscellany of different proposed solutions

Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Miscellany · Process (computing) · Section (typography) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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    Open Access•Mary Glowacki, Matteo Zicchetti•Erkenntnis•2026

  • Is higher-order evidence evidence

    Open Access•Eyal Tal•Philosophical Studies•2021

  • Conceptual limitations, puzzlement, and epistemic dilemmas

    Open Access•Michael Deigan•Philosophical Studies•2023

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    Open Access•Michael Vollmer•Philosophical Studies•2024

  • Does agnosticism have positive evidence

    Open Access•Nesim Aslantatar•International Journal for…•2025

  • Children's developing ability to adjust their beliefs reasonably in light of disagreement

    Open Access•Antonia Frederike Langenhoff, Jan M Engelmann et al.•Child Development•2023

  • Rational Suspension

    Open Access•Alexandra Zinke•Theoria•2021

  • Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude

    Open Access•J A Smart•Synthese•2021

  • The puzzle of defeated suspension

    Open Access•Michael Vollmer•Synthese•2024

  • Belief and rational indeterminacy

    Open Access•Neil Leonard•Synthese•2021

  • A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument

    Open Access•Diego E Machuca•Synthese•2017

  • Suspending is believing

    Open Access•T Raleigh•Synthese•2021

  • Rationality is Not Coherence

    Open Access•Nora Heinzelmann•The Philosophical Quarterly•2023

  • Another Argument Against Uniqueness

    T Raleigh•The Philosophical Quarterly•2016

Obras citantes distintas16
Citações por ano1,6
Intervalo de citações2016 - 2026 (11)
Velocidade de citaçãocurrent
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 16
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