Structural Conditions of Preferences for Segregation

An Application of Coleman's `Linear System of Action

Dados Bibliográficos

ID5917618
AutoresFrank Kalter (autor correspondente)
Ano2000
Volume12
Fascículo4
Páginas425-449
Data de publicação2000-11-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoRationality and Society (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/104346300012004004
OpenAlexW2137980355
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas6

Why might rational actors be interested in establishing a system of segregation, and under what structural conditions will this be more or less likely? To answer these questions, Coleman's `linear system of action' serves as a starting point. It can be shown that, given a random assignment of interest and control, a considerable number of actors may gain by splitting the group according to a binary ascriptive characteristic. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that they will indeed come to a respective agreement because ascriptive characteristics serve as focal points in collective decision-making. With the help of computer simulations, how the likelihood of group separation is affected by several structural parameters can be analyzed. It is evident that increasing the number of goods exchanged within a given system is a good recipe for preventing segregation

Arithmetic · Binary number · Collective action · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Public good · Sociology · Law · Mathematics · Names, Identity, and Discrimination Research · Social Power and Status Dynamics · Urban, Neighborhood, and Segregation Studies