Collective induction without cooperation? Learning and knowledge transfer in cooperative groups and competitive auctions

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6205628
AutoresBoris Maciejovsky (0000-0003-3195-0802, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), David V Budescu (0000-0001-9613-0317)
Ano2007
Volume92
Fascículo5
Páginas854-870
Data de publicação2007-05-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Personality and Social Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-3514 • E-ISSN: 1939-1315
EditoraAmerican Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.854
PMID17484609
OpenAlexW2150703294
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas14

There is strong evidence that groups perform better than individuals do on intellective tasks with demonstrably correct solutions. Typically, these studies assume that group members share common goals. The authors extend this line of research by replacing standard face-to-face group interactions with competitive auctions, allowing for conflicting individual incentives. In a series of studies involving the well-known Wason selection task, they demonstrate that competitive auctions induce learning effects equally impressive as those of standard group interactions, and they uncover specific and general knowledge transfers from these institutions to new reasoning problems. The authors identify payoff feedback and information pooling as the driving factors underlying these findings, and they explain these factors within the theoretical framework of collective induction

Common value auction · Economics · Group (periodic table) · Group decision-making · Incentive · Microeconomics · Pooling · Selection (genetic algorithm) · Stochastic game · Task (project management) · Artificial Intelligence · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Open Source Software Innovations · Psychology · Social Psychology