Political Institutions and Economic Performance
The Effects of Accountability and Obstacles to Policy Change
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6231054 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Allen Hicken (0000-0002-3995-953X, University of Michigan), Shanker Satyanath (New York University), Ernest Sergenti (New York University) |
| Ano | 2005 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 897-907 |
| Data de publicação | 2005-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00162.x |
| OpenAlex | W2019470462 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 18 |
| Referências citadas | 19 |
Numerous analyses have been conducted on how political institutions affect economic performance. In recent years the emphasis has been on a causal logic that emphasizes institutional obstacles to policy change, such as those presented by multiple veto points. This has especially been the case when it comes to the important question of how political institutions influence governments' responses to exogenous economic shocks. We make the case for a substantial broadening of focus and show that when it comes to a major type of exogenous shock, a forced exchange‐rate devaluation, variations in the breadth of accountability of the chief executive are more robustly associated with the post‐shock growth recovery than variations in obstacles to policy change. We first argue that the size of the winning coalition will be positively associated with growth recoveries following forced devaluations. We then use a newly developed measure of the size of the winning coalition to test our claim. Our statistical analysis is based on a study of the responses of 44 countries to forced exchange‐rate devaluations in the late 1990s
Accountability · Devaluation · Economics · Exchange rate · Macroeconomics · Political science · Politics · Shock (circulatory · Test (biology · Veto · Economic Policies and Impacts · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Law
Formal institutions and subjective well-being
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Neoinstitucionalismo como paradigma científico
Coordination in a Crisis
Has Democracy Slowed Growth in Asia
Credibility and Flexibility
A Grave Case of Myopia
Holding on? Ethnic divisions, political institutions and the duration of economic declines
The effect of economic downturns on voter turnout in Africa
Party System Nationalization and the Provision of Public Health Services
The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance
You Can’t Win If You Don’t Fight
Do Currency Crises Cause Capital Account Liberalization?1
Elections, Special Interests, and Financial Crisis
Shock the system
Who commits to the rule of law? Constrained government and foreign direct investment in postcommunist states
Democracy and the Logic of Political Survival
Sustaining Resilience Through Local Connectedness Among Sojourn Students
Politics and International Investment
Understanding Patterns of Economic Growth
Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses
The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements
The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth
Africa's Growth Tragedy
New Tools in Comparative Political Economy
Veto Players
The Politics of Economic Adjustment
The Logic of Political Survival
How Important to India's Poor Is the Sectoral Composition of Economic Growth
Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India
Constitutions and Commitment
Double Take
The Power of Institutions
The Limits of Delegation
| Obras citantes distintas | 18 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,9 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2006 - 2022 (17) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 18 |