The Who, When, and Where of Executive Nominations
Integrating Agency Independence and Appointee Ideology
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6231670 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Gary E Hollibaugh (0000-0001-9844-2437, University of Notre Dame), Lawrence S Rothenberg (0000-0003-2788-5585, University of Rochester) |
| Ano | 2018 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 296-311 |
| Data de publicação | 2018-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12345 |
| OpenAlex | W3123881292 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 24 |
| Referências citadas | 54 |
In recent years, scholars have expended considerable efforts to understand the executive appointment process and the forces influencing the choices made by the president and the Senate. However, some factors integral to theoretical models have not been well integrated empirically, and other relevant factors have not been incorporated much at all. Here, we focus on one determinant corresponding to the former critique—nominee ideology—and another corresponding to the latter—the independence of decision makers in the targeted agencies. We examine a series of theoretically driven hypotheses regarding the effects of both ideology and independence on who gets nominated and if and when nominees are eventually confirmed. Results show nominee ideology and decision maker independence matter a great deal and factor into presidential strategic choices and senatorial responses in ways according to expectations. Our findings have important ramifications for understanding appointments empirically and for future theoretical development
Agency (philosophy · Economics · Ideology · Independence (probability theory · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Presidential system · Public relations · Social science · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Mathematics · Policy Transfer and Learning · Psychology · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
Cutting in Line
There and back again
A theory of presidential centralization with politicization
Political ideology and information technology in government online communication
Legislative responses to shared executive authority
Presidential Strategy amidst the “Broken” Appointments Process
Going for Goals
The Importance of Position
Presidential Appointments of Military Veterans
The Contemporary Presidency
International Business - New Insights on Changing Scenarios
Do bureaucratic appointees change their minds? Preference stability at the NLRB
How to improve the substantive interpretation of regression results when the dependent variable is logged
Presidential Constraints on Supreme Court Decision-Making
Confirmation Dynamics
Executive policymaking influence via the administrative apparatus
The Fix is in? Parliamentary Scrutiny of Appointments of the Heads of Brazilian Regulatory Agencies
The Structure of Appointment Politics
Appointee vacancies in US executive branch agencies
Agency control through the appointed hierarchy
Appointments and attrition
The Longer You Wait, the Longer It Takes
Studying Bureaucracy in a Diverse Democracy
Hyperpartisanship and the First Hundred Days
The Politics of Presidential Appointments
Delegating Powers
Nonparametric Estimation from Incomplete Observations
Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy
Event History Modeling
Who do you trust? Presidential delegation in executive orders
Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy
Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations
Revisiting the Administrative Presidency
Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
First branch, or root? the Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve
Judicial Selection
Bayesian Factor Analysis for Mixed Ordinal and Continuous Responses
Naive Cronyism and Neutral Competence
Advice and Consent
To Advise and Consent
The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees
Secretaries of Pork? A New Theory of Distributive Public Policy
Sounding the Fire Alarm
Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process
The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process
Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices
Appointment Delay for Vacancies on the Federal Communications Commission
Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences
Female and Minority Judicial Nominees
Vacancies, vetting, and votes
Confirmation Dynamics
How uncertainty about judicial nominees can distort the confirmation process
Executive appointments
Who Influences the Fed? Presidential Versus Congressional Leadership
Strategic Appointments
The Limits of Foreign Aid Diplomacy
Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency
Mapping the Ideological Marketplace
Federal Reserve Policy Decision Making
Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998
Delaying Justice(s)
What Makes an Agency Independent
The Logic of Collective Inaction
Presidents and Patronage
The Changing Politics of Federal Judicial Nominations
Confirmation Delay for Vacancies on the Circuit Courts of Appeals
The When and Why of Nominations
The Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees
Political Control Versus Expertise
Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees
| Obras citantes distintas | 24 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 4 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 24 |