Theories of Legislative Institutions and the Organization of the Russian Duma
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6232567 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Thomas F Remington (0000-0002-1109-3121), Stephanie S Smith (0000-0001-9943-6717), Steven S Smith |
| Ano | 1998 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 545 |
| Data de publicação | 1998-04-01 |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Editora | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2991770 |
| OpenAlex | W2334735949 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 16 |
| Referências citadas | 7 |
Theory: Recent positive theory based on United States congressional studies argues for policy preference-based models to explain the choice of legislative institutions; an alternative theoretical approach holds that reelection goals shape preferences over institutional arrangements. Still other theorists emphasize supply-side explanations of partisanship and party leadership in enabling legislators to overcome collective action problems in policy and institutional choice. The question remains whether these diverse approaches can be combined into a single comprehensive theory. Hypotheses: The paper tests predictions flowing from policy, reelection, and party models for candidates' and members' preferences over several major organizational features of the new Russian State Duma, including its steering body, the powers assigned to party factions, and the rights of the chamber's chair. Method: Based on surveys conducted in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 among candidates for and deputies in the Duma, the paper reports estimates of the effects of policy positions, electoral mandate type, and party affiliation on participants' preferences for institutional arrangements within the Duma. Results: Evidence consistent with each explanation is found, although none fully accounts for important features of the Duma's organization. We conclude that theoretical progress in this field is not likely to take the form of a unified theory but, at least for the time being, is more likely to take the form of more fully elaborating altemative perspectives and testing their implications directly against each other for particular aspects of institutional choice
Economics · Field (mathematics · Law and economics · Legislature · Management · Mandate · Microeconomics · Organizational theory · Political science · Positive economics · Preference · State (computer science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
The Politics of Electoral Reform
Searching for party effects in post-communist Ukraine
Legislative Activism of Russian Duma Deputies, 1996–1999
Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan
Party and Personal Preference in Post‐Soviet Legislatures
Electoral Institutions and Party Cohesion in the Russian Duma
Candidate Recruitment and the Development of Russian Political Parties, 1993-99
Remaking the House and Senate
Defending the Institutional Status Quo
Invisible Politics
Gaining Legislative Control Through Strategic District Nomination
Paradoxes of Parties in Congress
Legislative Structure
Explaining Party Formation and Nonformation in Russia
Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions
The Hidden Effects of Rules Not Broken
| Citações por ano | 0,57 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citações | 1998 - 2011 (14) |
| Altamente citado | Não |