Oil Rents and Patronage

The Fiscal Effects of Oil Booms in the Argentine Provinces

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6247654
AutoresLucas I González (0000-0002-9512-6049, autor correspondente)
Ano2018
Volume51
Fascículo1
Páginas101-126
Data de publicação2018-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoComparative Politics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0010-4159 • E-ISSN: 2151-6227
EditoraComparative Politics CUNY (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.5129/001041518824414629
OpenAlexW2901059818
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas15

Oil rents turn democratic governments into authoritarian governments.They also help to consolidate and sustain authoritarian rule once in place.These are the claims several authors make connecting the rents from oil with the emergence and consolidation of authoritarian rule. 1 One of the most important causal connectors between large oil revenues and authoritarian rule is the way in which governments spend these rents from the oil sector.Some authors claim that rentier governments spend oil money to expand their political machines through patronage and clientelism, to buy off political loyalties, and to enlarge the repressive apparatus to suppress discontent.Several of these scholars argue that rentier theories adjust well to most countries in the Middle East (e.g., Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iran), as well as to others in Africa (Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, and Libya), Southeast Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia), Latin America (Venezuela, Ecuador, and Mexico), and even Europe (Russia and Azerbaijan).Oildependent governments can also spend revenue from oil booms on public goods, such as public infrastructure or social services, which appeal to a larger portion of citizens and may broaden the support base of their electorate.Norway is the quintessential case, an oil state in which there seems to be no rentier effect, as well as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom.When do oil-dependent governments decide to spend oil rents to expand their political machines through patronage, clientelism, and an enlarged repressive apparatus and when do they decide to provide better public services to their citizens to expand the support base of their electorate?This article analyzes the conditions under which large increases in oil rents produce more patronage and clientelism versus more spending in public services.In opposition to conventional rentier theories, this study argues that patronage spending tends to increase when oil rents decline in contexts of job destruction in the oil sector.Under those circumstances, incumbents use patronage to contain social discontent and secure their core voters.On the contrary, an increase in rents in contexts of job creation in the oil sector tends to increase capital investment.Under

Boom · Economic rent · Economics · Economy · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Oil boom · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies · Environmental Science