Fiscal Federalism
The Interaction between Own Revenues and Intergovernmental Transfers in Local Governments—The Case of Municipalities in Buenos Aires
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6375474 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Alberto Porto (Universidad Nacional de La Plata), Jorge Puig (0000-0001-5033-5608, Universidad Nacional de La Plata) |
| Ano | 2023 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 642-678 |
| Data de publicação | 2023-09-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Publius The Journal of Federalism (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0048-5950 • E-ISSN: 1747-7107 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/publius/pjad005 |
| OpenAlex | W4324138024 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 2 |
| Referências citadas | 66 |
We study the interaction between intergovernmental transfers on the level and the structure of local own revenues. Based on a sample for Argentina’s local governments, specifically the 135 municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires, we find that transfers facilitate local revenues collection. This effect is more pronounced in urban local governments, with higher population density, poverty levels, and demand for public services. In addition, transfers bias own revenues composition. That is, higher transfers lead to higher local tax collection, which is obtained through less distortionary taxation (i.e., property tax). Interestingly, this bias is stronger for local governments with a higher share of divisible public goods (that are likely to be financed according to the “benefit principle”). The results are robust to a battery of different estimation methods and can be rationalized with existing theory from public finance and political economy as well. The findings might have important policy implications for local governments’ public finance
Business · Decentralization · Economic policy · Economics · Federalism · fiscal federalism · Local government · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Population · Property tax · Public economics · Public finance · Public good · Revenue · Sample (material · Tax revenue · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Taxation and Compliance Studies · Finance · Public Administration
The Dangers of Decentralization
Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
Why do people pay taxes?
Economic competition among jurisdictions
Incentives to provide local public goods
Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data
Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models
Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially Dependent Panel Data
Ethnic Heterogeneity and Public Goods Provision in Zambia
The impact of intergovernmental transfers on local revenue generation in Sub-Saharan Africa
Do External Grants to District Governments Discourage Own Revenue Generation? A Look at Local Public Finance Dynamics in Ghana
Politics, institutions, and fiscal performance in a federal system
Tax competition and the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model
Second generation fiscal federalism
On the measurement of congestion in the provision of local public goods
Interjurisdictional capital mobility
Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods
The flypaper effect
Per-capita public expenditures and population size
Tax and expenditure limitations and the fiscal relationships between state and local governments
Does Urban Sprawl Increase the Costs of Providing Local Public Services? Evidence from Spanish Municipalities
Lagged Explanatory Variables and the Estimation of Causal Effect
A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes
A Model of Asymmetries in the Flypaper Effect
Urban Local Governments and the Flypaper Effect
The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers
Oil Rents and Patronage
The Soft Budget Constraint
American Government Finance in the Long Run
Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little
Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice
Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
Anomalies
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 2 |