Cabinet size and governance in Sub‐Saharan Africa
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6264516 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Joachim Wehner (0000-0002-1951-308X, Department of Government and School of Public Policy London School of Economics and Political Science London UK, autor correspondente), Linnea Mills (Independent researcher) |
| Ano | 2022 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 123-141 |
| Data de publicação | 2022-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Governance (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/gove.12575 |
| OpenAlex | W3022449478 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 7 |
| Referências citadas | 37 |
There is frequent public and media concern over the cost of bloated cabinets in many Sub‐Saharan African countries. Scholarship on elite clientelism links cabinet positions with corruption and practices that undermine sound policymaking. This article presents new data on the number of ministers in African governments and documents a robust negative association with several measures of governance, both across countries and in a regression framework that exploits within‐country variation over time and accounts for various potential confounders. This suggests policymakers, donors, investors, and citizens should pay close attention to the number of ministers appointed to the cabinet. Although the article cautions against simplistic policy prescriptions, a sizable increase in the number of ministers is likely bad news for governance
Cabinet (room · Clientelism · Corporate governance · Democracy · Development economics · Economic growth · Economics · Elite · Exploit · Geography · Language change · Political science · Politics · Scholarship · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Economic Growth and Development · International Development and Aid · Law · Public Administration · Finance
How Democracy Works
African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999
Fragmented fiscal policy
How Is Power Shared in Africa?
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy
The Logic of Political Survival
The Worldwide Governance Indicators
The Worldwide Governance Indicators
Exposing Corrupt Politicians
Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy
Politicians
Monitoring Corruption
Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond
Cabinets, Prime Ministers, and Corruption
Measuring Governance and Corruption through the Worldwide Governance Indicators
Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies
Kenya's New Constitution
Conditioning the Effects of Aid
Parties or Portfolio? The Economic Consequences of Africa’s Big Cabinets
Cabinet structure and fiscal policy outcomes
Determinants of cabinet size
Political Parties, Clientelism, and Bureaucratic Reform
Dominant Party Rule, Elections, and Cabinet Instability in African Autocracies
When Do You Get Economists as Policy Makers
The Enemy Within
The quality of government
Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis
Patronage and Political Stability in Africa
What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and how do they respond? Evidence from Ghana
Political Selection
Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance
| Obras citantes distintas | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,75 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 7 |