Political Groups, Leader Change, and the Pattern of International Cooperation

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6283486
AutoresAlastair Smith (0000-0002-5291-1442, Wilf Family Department of Politics New York University, New York, autor correspondente)
Ano2009
Volume53
Fascículo6
Páginas853-877
Data de publicação2009-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002709344419
OpenAlexW2167532193
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas14
Referências citadas35

Nations are politically heterogeneous and which group is in political ascendency shapes the nature of interstate cooperation through two mechanisms. First, groups differ in the benefits they receive from cooperation. This affects which groups can commit to cooperate. Second, a nation may selectively withhold cooperation from one group to influence the domestic political competition between groups in another nation. By integrating political competition between leaders of different groups under different institutional rules into a prisoner’s dilemma model of international cooperation, the theory generates hypotheses relating leader turnover, group membership, and patterns of cooperation

Biology · Commit · Competition (biology · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Group (periodic table · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Prisoner's dilemma · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance