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Picking Treaties, Picking Winners

International Treaty Negotiations and the Strategic Mobilization of Domestic Interests

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6285491
AutoresJoseph M Brown (0000-0001-6105-4799, Columbia University), Johannes Urpelainen (Columbia University)
Ano2015
Volume59
Fascículo6
Páginas1043-1073
Data de publicação2015-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002713520479
OpenAlexW2103886443
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas47

International treaty negotiations and domestic politics are interrelated. We show that negotiators can strategically select treaties to mobilize domestic interest groups and support particular candidates for office. Interest groups will support (oppose) political parties that will ratify treaties benefiting (harming) them. By designing treaties that mobilize these “swing” groups, negotiators can affect different parties’ chances of assuming power. Our model produces specific predictions for treaty design, contingent on the preferences of negotiators, parties, and interest groups. With conservative and moderate interest groups, the results may be counterintuitive—for instance, foreign governments pushing liberal treaties on liberal incumbents they dislike, intentionally mobilizing interest groups against the treaty and in favor of conservative challengers. Highly competitive systems, particularly those where moderate interest groups’ support is in play, give treaty negotiators leeway to shape political outcomes. Powerful interest groups may exert strong influence or no influence, depending on the cost of appeasing them and whether domestic and foreign negotiators are willing to gamble the incumbent’s political future for the achievement of their policy ideals

Counterintuitive · Economics · Foreign policy · Interest group · Law and economics · National interest · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Special Interest Group · Treaty · European Union Policy and Governance · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

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Obras citantes distintas8
Citações por ano0,89
Intervalo de citações2017 - 2023 (7)
Velocidade de citaçãohistorical
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 8
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