Signaling by Signature

The Weight of International Opinion and Ratification of Treaties by Domestic Veto Players

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6341815
AutoresDavid Hugh-Jones, Karolina Milewicz, Milewicz Karolina, Hugh Ward
Ano2018
Volume6
Fascículo1
Páginas15-31
Data de publicação2018-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPolitical Science Research and Methods (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 2049-8470 • E-ISSN: 2049-8489
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psrm.2016.10
OpenAlexW2287874611
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas7
Referências citadas44

The signing of international treaties is usually considered insignificant for international legal cooperation. Accordingly, International Relations theorists have paid it little attention. We show in this paper how and why treaty signature matters for the ultimate decision to ratify an international treaty. We argue that when multiple well-informed actors publicly sign an international treaty, this can provide a strong signal of issue importance to domestic veto players, and in turn may persuade them to ratify the treaty. We formalize this argument in a two-level signaling game, and test it on a data set of 126 international environmental agreements. We find that treaties are more likely to be ratified when their signatories include countries with high levels of general or issue-specific knowledge

Argument (complex analysis · Business · Economics · International relations · International trade · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Ratification · Signaling game · Sovereignty · Test (biology · Treaty · Veto · Corruption and Economic Development · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance