Executive control of bureaucracy and presidential cabinet appointments in East Asian democracies

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6377697
AutoresDon S Lee (0000-0001-9138-9661)
Ano2020
Volume14
Fascículo1
Páginas82-101
Data de publicação2020-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoRegulation & Governance (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1748-5983 • E-ISSN: 1748-5991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/rego.12190
OpenAlexW2789547770
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas23
Referências citadas48

This article examines the role of cabinet appointments in controlling the bureaucracy in presidential democracies. I demonstrate how administrative challenges stemming from the structure of the bureaucracy shape presidential choice of ministers. Analyzing a sample of four East Asian cases from 1986 through 2013, I find that presidents are more likely to select ministers from the civil service as bureaucracies are more professionalized, controlling for several political factors. Further evidence from qualitative interviews and case studies suggests that, in professionalized systems equipped with a sizable pool of talent but lacking responsiveness, presidents tend to promote ideologically aligned senior civil servants. However, in politicized systems, where presidents easily obtain responsiveness but face a low level of competence, policy experts tend to be selected from outside the bureaucracy. My findings have important implications for the regulatory governance and state capacity of East Asia, demonstrating the value of balancing between responsiveness and competence

Bureaucracy · Cabinet (room · Competence (human resources · Corporate governance · Economics · Management · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Public relations · Sociology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research