Conflict between Explicit and Tacit Public Service Bargains in U.K. Executive Agencies

Dados Bibliográficos

ID7293449
AutoresThomas Elston (0000-0001-6659-7928, University of Oxford, autor correspondente)
Ano2016
Volume30
Fascículo1
Páginas85-104
Data de publicação2016-02-05
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoGovernance (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/gove.12191
OpenAlexW2287648125
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas10
Referências citadas35

Public service bargains (PSBs) define rewards, competencies, and loyalties for civil servants. They involve both explicit and tacit agreements with politicians. The article suggests that these two kinds of bargain may not be closely coordinated with one another, and can become “loosely coupled,” operating and evolving with relative independence. This is particularly likely when there is conflict between rational‐actor preferences and institutional expectations about political‐administrative behavior. Such a trade‐off can be managed by “decoupling” the explicit and tacit PSB, so that they operate differently in public and in private. Loose coupling results in inconsistent PSBs that are resistant to change, whereas decoupling highlights the compliance costs that actors face when securing cultural legitimacy for their bargains. These arguments are illustrated by the long‐term development of “Next Steps” agencies in the United Kingdom, where a marked disjuncture has emerged between the stated and practiced PSB

Business · Civil servants · Decoupling (probability · Independence (probability theory · Law and economics · Legitimacy · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Public service · Sociology · Tacit knowledge · Law · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies