Public service bargains and non-partisan ministerial advisors
Servants of two masters
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9963809 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Rose Cole (0000-0002-0290-6784, Victoria University of Wellington, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2020 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 757-773 |
| Data de publicação | 2020-09-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | International Review of Administrative Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0020-8523 • E-ISSN: 1461-7226 |
| Editora | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852320955217 |
| OpenAlex | W3087067850 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 2 |
| Referências citadas | 20 |
To what extent can the public service bargain framework be applied to non-partisan ministerial advisors? Public service bargains are defined as ‘explicit or implicit agreements between public servants – the civil or uniformed services of the state – and those they serve’. The public service bargain framework has increasingly been used as an analytical tool with which to examine the elements of the bargain as experienced by various actors in different jurisdictions. The elements of the public service bargain framework are explored through the experiences of a distinct subgroup of non-partisan advisors – portfolio private secretaries – serving in the politicised environment of ministers’ offices. The minister’s office has been characterised as the ‘purple zone’ where politics (represented by the colour blue) and administration (represented by the colour red) converge to transform political will into administrative action. This qualitative research article: briefly reviews the public service bargain literature; describes the actors and setting; gives voice to their experience of the public service bargain; applies the public service bargain heuristic; and reveals new insights into how the public service bargain operates with dual principals. Points for practitioners The public service bargain framework allows for dual principal–single agent relationships within public administration settings. Applying the public service bargain heuristic to this group of non-partisan advisors: enables a view of how the public service bargain operates at different levels (macro, meso and micro); shows that the public service bargain for these advisors has changed over time in response to administrative reforms; and demonstrates that these advisors are professionally and personally affected through the misaligned expectations of dual principals
Business · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Public service · Service (business · Law · Marketing · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
Policy Bureaucracy
The Politics of Public Service Bargains
The Discovery of Grounded Theory
Civil Service Reforms, Public Service Bargains and Dynamics of Institutional Change
Maintaining neutrality in the Minister's office
Politicians, political advisers and the vocabulary of public service bargains
Conflict between Explicit and Tacit Public Service Bargains in U.K. Executive Agencies
Does politics crowd out professional competence? The organisation of ministerial advice in Denmark and Sweden
Making Narrative Count
Control, Bargains, and Cheating
Toward a New Era of Administrative Reform? The Myth of Post‐NPM in New Zealand
Interpretation and its others
The Public Service Bargain in the United Kingdom
Integrating Rigor and Relevance in Public Administration Scholarship
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,67 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2023 - 2024 (2) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 2 |