Hume's Scepticism and Realism

In this article, a novel interpretation of one of the problems of Hume scholarship is defended: his view of Metaphysical Realism or the belief in an external world (that there are ontologically and causally perception-independent, absolutely external and continued, i.e. Real entities). According to this interpretation, Hume's attitude in the domain of philosophy should be distinguished from his view in the domain of everyday life: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgement on Realism, whereas Hume the common man firmly believes in the existence of Real entities. The defended reading is thus a sceptical and Realist interpretation of Hume. As such, it belongs to the class of what can be called no-single-Hume interpretations (Richard H. Popkin, Robert J. Fogelin, Donald L. M. Baxter), by contrast to single-Hume readings, which include Realist (naturalist, New Humean) and the traditional Reid-Green interpretation (i.e. Hume believes that there are no Real entities). Hume's distinction between the domains of philosophy and everyday life, which is argued to be epistemological, is employed in order to reconcile his scepticism with his naturalism and constructive science of human nature. The article pays special attention to the too much neglected second profound argument against the senses in Part 1, Section 12 of Hume's first Enquiry and the corresponding argument in Section 4, Part 4, Book 1 of the Treatise. Keywords: David Humescepticismrealismnaturalismexternal world Notes 1Following Michael J. Loux (Citation2002, 250), in order to distinguish Metaphysical Realism and Metaphysically Real entities from the other uses of 'realism' and 'real' (and its cognates), I write the former with the capital 'r'. For the sake of brevity, I will henceforth drop 'Metaphysical'. 2All references to the first Enquiry are to Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, edited by T. L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000). All references to the Treatise are to Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007). Both will be cited by a series of Arabic numerals: four in the case of the Treatise (book, chapter, section, paragraph) and two in the case of the Enquiry (section and paragraph). 3The Humean understanding of Realism requires three remarks of clarification. In the first place, I would like to emphasise that it is precisely this definition that begins Hume's discussion of external existence both in the first Enquiry and the Treatise. As this definition of Realism is highly abstracted, there can be several specific descriptions of Real entities. In principle, it is also possible that there are more than one kind of these entities (e.g. matter, God). This article discusses Hume's attitude to the existence of Real entities on this level of abstraction. Thus, I do not have to discuss his following two distinctions: (1) distinguishing Real entities as 'specifically different from our perceptions' from Real entities as not specifically different from perceptions (T 1.2.6.9, 1.4.2.2 and 1.4.5.19–20), and (2) the distinction between the 'vulgar' and different philosophical accounts of Real entities in EHU 12.9–14 and T 1.4.2 (Representative Realism) and EHU 12.15 and T 1.4.4 (Real entities having only primary qualities). As Hume's discussion in both the works clearly indicates, all these may be thought to fall (right or wrong) into the category of Real entities. Besides, the talk about objects 'specifically different from our perceptions' vanishes from the first Enquiry. In the second place, Hume must make the distinction between ontological and causal perception-independence/dependence: between existence depending on perceptions and perceiving affecting properties. Otherwise we cannot make sense of a curious aspect of Hume's discussion in T 1.4.2: it is consistent to think that perceptions are independent existences but it is a gross mistake to take them as such (T 1.4.2.39 and 44–5). If we make the distinction between ontological and causal independence/dependence, this apparent contradiction is avoided: perceptions are ontologically independent but causally dependent entities. It is Hume's reason for denying that perceptions are Real that they are causally dependent on perceiving, i.e. the process of perception affects their content (T 1.4.2.44–5). From this we can conclude regarding Real entities that according to Hume they must be both ontologically and causally perception-independent, i.e. perceiving does not affect their properties. This is confirmed by the fact that in the Treatise, Hume explicitly distinguishes ontological independence from operational, i.e. causal independence: 'Under this last head I comprehend their situation as well as relations, their external position as well as the independence of their existence and operation. (T 1.4.2.2)' In the third place, the Humean definition of Realism involves externality in absolute as opposite to perception-dependent space. Hume suggests this by the following formulation in the first Enquiry: 'an external universe, which depends not on our perception. (EHU 12.7)' 4So I will speak not only about Real entities but sometimes also of 'Real matter, bodies, causes and powers' meaning material substance, individual bodies composed of it, and individual bodies as causes and powers. 5The connection between Hume's attitude to Realism and the New Humean interpretation of Hume's view of causation is a complicated matter. Here there is no room for pursuing this question, but I will say something about it in the conclusion. For the summary of the New Hume debate, see Read and Richman Citation2007, Kail Citation2008, and Millican Citation2009. 6My claim is restricted to Hume's view of Realism. I am not stating that the relation is same in the other parts of Hume's philosophy such as his attitude to induction. 7I would like to emphasise that none of the no-single-Hume interpretations is intended to imply that Hume was a split personality, that there were two really distinct persons/subjects in him. There was only one historical David Hume (at least there is no evidence for him being schizophrenic). But this Hume had different views in philosophy and common life. 8The summary elaborates upon the reconstruction of the second profound argument against the senses that I defend in my dissertation, which is a published book. I analyse it in meticulous detail and present a structural diagram of it (Hakkarainen Citation2007, chap. 3.4). 9A fine summary of this interpretation can be found in Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), edited by Derek R. Brookes and Knud Haakonsen (Edinburgh, 2002), 162. For other references, see Kemp Smith 2005, 3–8 and chap. IV, and Norton Citation1982, 3–5, 192, and 196–204. It was also endorsed by H. H. Price (Citation1940, 227) in his otherwise more positive phenomenalist reading of Hume in the 1940s. Recently, Louis Loeb is amongst the few who has defended it as a side topic of his book (2002, viii and 215–6). 10The exact description of the New Humean interpretation is not an easy task. This is exemplified by Peter Kail's characterisation as he includes the mere sceptical view in it. Yet he calls the mere sceptical view 'realist' because according to him it is committed to the comprehensibility and metaphysical possibility of causation as more than mere regularity ('thick' connection, for example). This is understandable in the discussion over Hume's theory of causation because the context of the New Humeans is to oppose the anti-realist Old Humen account, according to which Hume denies causation as anything more than mere observed regularity (Kail Citation2008, 442–3 and 450–1). However, we should keep the interpretations of Hume's view on causation and Causal Realism separate from interpreting his attitude to Realism in general because they are different although related issues. This has three significant consequences. (1) The different views about Hume on Realism should be primarily classified by what they say about Hume's doxastic attitude to the existence of Real entities (although this is connected to conceptual and semantic issues and related to Hume's view on causation). (2) In this categorisation, John P. Wright's, Strawson's and Kail's New Humean interpretations are Realist as they claim that Hume is committed – however weakly – to the existence of Real entities. This is manifested by their eagerness to argue against Hume's endorsement of the second profound argument as will be shown below. (3) The mere sceptical position on Realism should be called non-Realist because it does not involve any positive doxastic attitude to the existence of Real entities. Calling it 'Realist' because it acknowledges the comprehensibility of what is suspended is not satisfactory. As this article shows, it is not necessary for suspending judgement on the existence of entity x that x can be understood. When its incomprehensibility (in the sense of vacuousness) is realised, a completely reasonable option is to suspend judgement, to be silent about its existence. 11In Livingston's view, Hume takes the everyday belief in Real entities as a transcendental presupposition of our experience and reasoning (1984, 3 and 15). For Baier, Hume's 'true philosophy' is the critical application and self-reflection of common life beliefs and reasonings including the belief in Real entities (1991, 20–7). Morris claims that Hume advocates a return to common life from the philosophical 'problem space' of 'modern philosophy'. Modern philosophy produces the hardest sceptical argument against the belief in Real entities, T 1.4.4, which corresponds to what I am calling the second profound argument (Morris Citation2000, 108–9). 12All references to the Abstract are to Hume, An Abstract of a Book lately published, entitled. A Treatise of Human Nature, &c. wherein the chief argument of that book is farther illustrated and explained (1740), A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton (Oxford, 2007), 403–417. Hume's Abstract is cited by Abs. and an Arabic numeral referring to paragraph. 13The New Humean position may be formulated in the way that the doxastic propositional attitude to the existence of Real entities is weaker than belief. It may be supposing, taking for granted or assuming (Kail Citation2008, 446). Anyhow, all of these are commitments to the existence of Real entities – even if the degree of the commitment varies. The point of my argument concerns ontological commitment. Thus, my argument against attributing the belief in Real entities can work against them, too. For the sake of brevity, I will speak only about belief. 14Note that this premise concerns the comprehensible properties of Real entities (matter and bodies). In their set, perceptible primary qualities are the only candidates for the Real properties of matter. But matter may have incomprehensible properties in addition to primary qualities and proper sensibles. So the PSP alone (step 5) does not imply the principle that matter has only primary qualities. The PSP is independent from the latter principle. 15One of the virtues of this schematic reconstruction is thus that different positions and disagreements in the literature can be singled out nicely by its means. 16I cannot argue this point fully here; for the present purposes, this will do. I have made a full case elsewhere (Hakkarainen Citation2007, 245–52). It might be also the case that Hume's two definitions of cause (EHU 7.29 and T 1.3.14.31) require that both relata of causation are perceptible. In Strawson's relative idea, the cause is not (in his own view). So it would not be permitted to employ causal concepts in describing it. 17Garrett made me this comment in conversation. 18These points originate in Winkler Citation2007 and Flage Citation2007. 19In the article, there is no room to discuss the possible textual evidence for this in EHU 12.9, 16, T 1.2.6.8–9 and 1.4.5.19–20. I have argued elsewhere that these passages do not constitute sufficient evidence for ascribing the doctrine of the relative idea of Real matter to Hume (Hakkarainen Citation2007, 232–44). 20EHU 1.14.n.1 (in 1748–50 editions), T 3.1.1.26, T 1.4.4.3–4, T 1.4.4.15, T 1.4.7.4, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (Hereafter: E), Of the Standard of Taste (Hereafter: ST), 234, 229–30, and E, The Sceptic (Hereafter: S), 166, n.3. All references to E are to Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (1741 – 1777), edited by E. F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987). Hume's Essays are cited by the abbreviation of the title of the essay and an Arabic number referring to page number. I have made a full case for this in Hakkarainen Citation(2011). 21Kail has suggested that what Garrett calls Hume's 'Title Principle' (1997, 234) provides Hume means for avoiding commitment to the second profound argument. Kail's tempting solution is that this argument is undermined by the Title Principle because in it reasoning does not mix with 'a natural propensity', which the Title Principle requires of authoritative reasonings (2007, 70). However, Kail's solution does not work for two reasons. First, there is no specific textual evidence for it. The Title Principle occurs only once in Hume's works (T 1.4.7.11). The context of this occurrence is Hume's answer to the Pyrrhonian moment (Ibid.8) created by scepticism with regard to reason (Ibid.7 and T 1.4.1). Hume does not bring it forward as a reply to T 1.4.4 and its recapitulation at 1.4.7.4–5. So Kail's solution suffers from insufficient textual evidence. Secondly, I have shown that Hume endorses all the premises of the second profound argument. Thus, it is not coherent for him to reject, because of the Title Principle, their conjunction, that is, the second profound argument (one cannot accept p and q but not their conjunction). 23It is true that Hume says in this passage that the contradiction is generated by successive assent to the consistent use of reason and the belief in Realism. My reading of the passage is that he cannot mean that the contradiction holds diachronically. His point is rather that successive assent to the proper exercise of reason and the belief in Realism produces the contradiction between simultaneous suspension of this belief and holding it. 22EHU 2.4, 3.16.n.6, 4.21, 5.10, 8.8, 8.36, 12.20, 12.n.34, T 1.1.5.8, 1.4.4.1, 1.4.5.1–2, 14, 1.4.6.2, 1.4.7.4–8, 3.App.10 and 21 24It is a different issue how this is possible if Hume is a fully-fledged determinist. 25After this article was submitted and revised, Fogelin published a new book Hume's Skeptical Crisis – A Textual Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 26For a detailed account, see Fogelin Citation1985, 80ff. 27In order to avoid this problem, I think, in his book Baxter develops this interpretation in a direction that comes close to the naturalist interpretations and makes his reading vulnerable to the inconsistency problem. Now the Humean conception of reason, including induction, belongs to the passive assent as well as the belief in Realism (Baxter Citation2008, 9–14). What is more, both exemplify 'stable' passive assents, which Hume prefers to varying assents of the same kind (Ibid. 9). The active assent is the sphere of 'rationalist reason', 'an idealized kind of belief assumed by his opponents and by most of us' (Ibid. 101 and 9). Baxter cannot thus distinguish the second profound argument from the belief in Realism as belonging to distinct kinds of assents. His interpretation is not therefore able to avoid the inconsistency problem between the two anymore. This is the reason why I focus on his earlier view. 28EHU 4.21, 5.2, 12.5, 21, 23, 24, 25, T 1.4.2, intro.1–3, E, Of Essay-Writing (Hereafter: EW), 533–4, and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Hereafter: DNR) 1.9. All references to DNR are to Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), edited by D. Coleman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Hume's Dialogues is cited by DNR and two Arabic numerals referring to Part and paragraph. 29Hume thinks that embracing some contradictions is not so serious in everyday life (T 1.4.7.7, EHU 4.21 and DNR 1.10) . 30I would like to emphasise that Realism is the philosophical analysis of the everyday belief. I am not ascribing to Hume the claim that everyday people are aware that they endorse the philosophical tenet of Realism or that it is identical in details with philosophical Realisms. This is completely coherent with how Hume himself discusses the issue (EHU 12.7–9, 14, 16 and T 1.4.2). 31The question how this distinction is supposed to work generally in Hume's thinking cannot be pursued here. I believe though that it is a fruitful perspective to many topics such as induction and personal identity. 32In itself, my account does not rule it out that the belief in Realism and suspending this belief may be simultaneous. Whether it implies that these attitudes cannot be simultaneous is a further issue that cannot be discussed here. This implication seems to require the additional premise that denies the psychological possibility of entertaining these contradictory attitudes in different domains at the same time. However, discussing this premise would require another article. It clearly depends on what belief and suspension are and what Hume's theory of belief says about them. 33It may be so, for instance, that the philosophical domain is preferable from the domain of common life as well for two reasons. (1) The distinction between their epistemic standards is a difference in degree. (2) The rational capacities that these domains share are merely followed more rigorously and consistently in the philosophical discourse. 34For an introduction to this discussion, see Rysiew P., 'Epistemic Contextualism', in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 Edition), edited by E. N. Zalta (URL = ). 35Hume's Academical philosophy consists of two attitudes. The first of them is doubt, suspension, caution and modesty (EHU 5.1 and 12.24). The second attitude is 'confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding' or 'the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding' (EHU 5.1 and 12.25). These limits are set by a kind of empiricist epistemological realism. According to Hume, experience is the standard of knowledge and justified belief: 'experience [...] is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge' (EHU 12.29; see also 5.1 and DNR 1.10). That the sceptical and Realist reading of Hume is compatible with the second element of Hume's Academical philosophy would call for an extended argument. There is no room here for that discussion. Yet it may be noted that some kind of phenomenalist epistemological realism, for instance, seems to be coherent with suspension of judgement on the existence of Real entities. Besides, this suspension does not rule out agreement on what we experience. It is that agreement perhaps that can work as the empirical basis for judging beliefs. 36For what I take to be a devastating argument against any form of the New Humean intepretation of Hume's theory of causation, see Millican Citation2009, §§6–8. 37I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr Peter Millican (Hertford College, Oxford), Professors Kenneth Winkler (Yale), Donald Baxter (University of Connecticut), Don Garrett (NYU), Todd Ryan (Trinity College, Hartford), Abraham Anderson (Sarah Lawrence College), Daniel Flage (James Madison University), Michael Della Rocca (Yale) and Dr Peter Kail (St Peter's College, Oxford) for corrections, comments, and criticism. I am also grateful for the invitations to and the audiences at the following universities, seminars, and workshops: Trinity College, Hartford, CT (04/09/2009), University of Connecticut (11/20/2008), University at Buffalo (SUNY) (11/13/2008), Society for Early Modern Philosophy at Yale (SEMPY) (9/10/2008), The Montreal Inter-University Workshop in the History of Philosophy (McGill University, Montreal, 9/23/2008), The Nordic Workshop in Early Modern Philosophy (NWEMP) (University of Tartu, Estonia, 5/31/2008), and University of Uppsala, Sweden (5/21/2008

Epistemology · Realism · Skepticism · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · Philosophy

• O não realismo cético de David Hume

  Open Access•Camila Sousa Ferreira, Carlota Salgadinho Ferreira•DoisPontos•2020

  Incluir item

• Is Hume a Perspectivalist

  Open Access•Sam Zahn•Ergo an Open Access Journal of…•2025

  Incluir item

• The Concept of Body in Hume’s Treatise

  Mirko Boehm, Miren Boehm et al.•ProtoSociology•2013

  Incluir item

• Hume’s Mitigated Skepticism With Regard to the Systems of Reality

  Open Access•Wendel De Holanda Pereira Campelo•Kriterion Revista de Filosofia•2022

  Incluir item

• Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist

  Open Access•Jani Hakkarainen•Journal of Scottish Philosophy•2012

  Incluir item

• How ideas connect to the world

  Open Access•Andrew Brown•Studies in East European Thought•2024

  Incluir item

• Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12

  Open Access•Haitao Qu, Hsueh Qu•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2017

  Incluir item

• Hume's Conclusions in “Conclusion of this Book”

  Don Garrett•The Blackwell Guide to Hume's…•2006

  Incluir item

• Identity, Continued Existence, and the External World

  Donald L M Baxter•The Blackwell Guide to Hume's…•2006

  Incluir item

• Hume-Arg Philosophers

  Barry Stroud•Hume-Arg Philosophers•2003

  Incluir item

• Cognition and Commibnent in Hume’s Philosophy

  Don Garrett•Cognition and commitment in…•1997

  Incluir item

• A Progress of Sentiments

  Annette C Baier•Progress of Sentiments•1991

  Incluir item

• The constraints of Hume’s naturalism

  Open Access•Barry Stroud•Synthese•2006

  Incluir item

• The New Hume

  Kenneth P Winkler•The Philosophical Review•1991

  Incluir item

• Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature

  Michael Williams, Robert J Fogelin•The Philosophical Review•1988

  Incluir item

• Humes Academic Scepticism

  Open Access•John Wright, John P Wright•Canadian Journal of Philosophy•1986

  Incluir item

• Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy

  P J E Kail•Projection and Realism in Hume's…•2007

  Incluir item

• David Hume

  Richard H Popkin•The Philosophical Quarterly•1951

  Incluir item