Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption

A Note on Wealth as a Corruption‐Controlling Device

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9704061
AutoresRafael Di Tella (Harvard Business School), Federico Weinschelbaum (0000-0002-4008-1787, University of San Andrés)
Ano2008
Volume118
Fascículo532
Páginas1552-1571
Data de publicação2008-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02180.x
OpenAlexW2017621605
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas21

There are a large number of cases where corruption has been discovered when investigating levels of consumption that appear to be hard to justify. The informativeness of an agent's level of consumption depends on his legal income and initial level of wealth, as conspicuous consumption by wealthy agents leads to little updating of the principal's belief about their honesty. This introduces a tendency to prefer poor agents as they are easier to monitor. More generally, we describe the basic problem of choosing agents and monitoring consumption with the aim of reducing corruption, and discuss features of the practical applications. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008

Computer security · Consumption (sociology · Economics · Honesty · Language change · Microeconomics · Political science · Principal (computer security · Public economics · Sociology · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems