Corruptible Law Enforcers
How Should They Be Compensated
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9718261 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Dilip Mookherjee (0000-0001-8719-0991, Indian Statistical Institute), Ivan Png (0000-0001-7463-5517, University of California, Los Angeles), I P L Png |
| Ano | 1995 |
| Volume | 105 |
| Fascículo | 428 |
| Páginas | 145 |
| Data de publicação | 1995-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2235324 |
| OpenAlex | W2060951857 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 69 |
| Referências citadas | 4 |
We study the optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, charged with monitoring pollution from a factory. Our utilitarian approach focuses on the trade-off among corruption, pollution, and enforcement effort. Owing to the strategic interaction between factory and inspector, changes in compensation policy have surprising effects, e.g., raising the penalty for corruption may cause pollution to increase. We find that bribery is an inefficient way of encouraging the inspector to monitor; society should wipe out corruption
Business · Compensation (psychology · Economics · Enforcement · Factory (object-oriented programming · Language change · Law and economics · Law enforcement · Political science · Public economics · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Pollution
Corruption, Pricing of Public Services, and Entrepreneurship in Economies with Leakage
Combating Corruption with Bargaining Disruption
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Taxation and Development
Anti‐Corruption Policies for Surprise Inspections
Impacts of Bribery in Healthcare in Vietnam
Taxes and Bribes in Uganda
Governance and Development
Up before Dawn
Improving Transparency in Pharmaceutical Systems
Ownership, Competition, and Corruption
Investigating Corruption
Corruption under Moral Hazard
Labor Regulations and the Cost of Corruption
What Determines Corruption? International Evidence From Microdata
The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires
Corruption as Betrayal
The public management of risk
Facing China's demand for timber
Monitoring and enforcement
Corruption in environmental policy
Negotiation versus manipulation
Two Views of Corruption and Democracy
The economist’s approach to the problem of corruption
Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries
The Policy Roots of Socioeconomic Stagnation and Environmental Implosion
Controlling Fiscal Corruption
Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation
Who gains from non-collusive corruption
Kompromat
Informal fiscal systems in developing countries
Competition and corruption in an agency relationship
Locational asymmetry and the potential for cooperation on a canal
Strategic analysis of petty corruption
Competition in bureaucracy and corruption
Legalize, tax, and deter
Beneficial collusion in corruption control
Corruption and local democratization in Indonesia
A Theoretical Analysis of Income Tax Evasion, Optimal Auditing, and Credibility in Developing Countries
Competition among officials and the abuse of power
Can corruption foster regulatory compliance
Correlated payoffs in the inspection game
The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures
Government fragmentation versus fiscal decentralization and corruption
Bureaucratic beliefs and law enforcement
Hold your nose and vote
When Local Models Fail
Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers
Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement
Corruption and Reputation
Corruption in social relations
Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent
Performance‐based Wages in Tax Collection
Revisiting the Link between Politicians’ Salaries and Corruption
Pre‐emptive Corruption, Hold‐up and Repeated Interactions
Bribes and Bureaucracy Size
Self‐reporting and Market Structure
Comparing Corruption in the Laboratory and in the Field in Burkina Faso and in Canada
Economic Analysis of Corruption
Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption
L'infrastructure de transport « immatérielle » des ports de Maputo et Durban
Determinants of corruption in China
Motivation, Discretion, and Corruption
Tax Toleration and Tax Compliance
Corruption and Regulatory Structures
On Control Losses in Hierarchies
Up before Dawn
Eight Questions about Corruption
A Model of Nongovernmental Organization Regulation with an Application to Uganda
| Obras citantes distintas | 69 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2,3 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1996 - 2026 (31) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 67 |