Incentives in the Public Sector

Evidence from a Government Agency

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9711147
AutoresStephen Burge (0000-0001-7206-3674, University of Bristol), Simon Burgess (University of Bristol, CMPO and CEPR), Carol Propper (0000-0002-8257-431X, University of Bristol, CMPO, Imperial College London and CEPR), Marisa Ratto (0000-0003-4521-2448, Universite Paris‐Dauphine, LEDa‐SDFi), Emma Tominey (University of York, CMPO, and IZA)
Ano2017
Volume127
Fascículo605
PáginasF117-F141
Data de publicação2017-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12422
OpenAlexW2234629593
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas13
Referências citadas36

We study the impact of team-based performance pay in a major UK government agency, the public employment service. The scheme covered quantity and quality targets, measured with varying degrees of precision. We use unique data from the agency’s performance management system and personnel records, linked to local labour market data. We show that on average the scheme had no significant effect but had a substantial positive effect in small teams, fitting an explanation combining free riding and peer monitoring. We also show that the impact was greater on better-measured quantity outcomes than quality outcomes. The scheme was very cost effective in small offices

Actuarial science · Agency (philosophy · Business · Differential (mechanical device · Economic growth · Economics · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Microeconomics · Performance-related pay · Perspective (graphical · Productivity · Public economics · Public sector · Quality (philosophy · Scheme (mathematics · Accounting and Organizational Management · Computer Science · Engineering · Public Policy and Administration Research