Memory and Anticipation

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9719374
AutoresB Douglas Bernheim (0000-0002-6483-7622, Stanford University and NBER), Raphael Thomadsen (0000-0003-3958-5416, Columbia University)
Ano2005
Volume115
Fascículo503
Páginas271-304
Data de publicação2005-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.00989.x
OpenAlexW3125084272
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas7
Referências citadas32

The introduction of memory imperfections into models of economic decision making creates a natural role for anticipatory emotions. Their combination has striking behavioural implications. The paper first shows that agents can rationally select apparently dominated strategies. We consider Newcomb's Paradox and the Prisoners' Dilemma. We provide a resolution for Newcomb's Paradox and argue it requires the decision maker to ascribe only a tiny weight to anticipatory emotions. For some ranges of parameters, it is possible to obtain cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma with probability arbitrarily close to unity. The second half of the paper provides a theory of reminders. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society

Anticipation (artificial intelligence · Columbia university · Media studies · Sociology · Artificial Intelligence · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology