Good Samaritans vs. Hardliners
The Role of Credible Signalling in Greek Bailout Negotiations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10069738 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alexandra Hennessy (Seton Hall University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 744-761 |
| Publication date | 2016-12-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/jcms.12523 |
| OpenAlex | W2561399663 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 22 |
In this paper, we model the interactions between Greece and its creditors as a costly signalling game. The main argument is that a costly exchange of information can improve the recipient's incentives to comply with conditionality. If creditors can credibly signal that suspending financial assistance is a viable option, they will be able to extract concessions from the recipient. Conversely, if the feasibility of the outside option is in doubt, threats to withhold financial support will be toothless. Our contribution is to highlight the role of information exchanges during crisis bargaining. Such signalling mechanisms are central to understanding the outcomes of the Greek debt drama, but are absent from existing accounts
Argument (complex analysis · Bailout · Business · Conditionality · Creditor · Debt · Economics · Financial crisis · Incentive · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Signalling · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Finance · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Law · Medicine · State Capitalism and Financial Governance
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Leveraging the European Refugee Crisis
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Audience Heterogeneity, Costly Signaling, and Threat Prioritization
When do crises centralise decision-making? The core executive in the Greek economic crisis
Puzzled out? The unsurprising outcomes of the Greek bailout negotiations
Merit recruitment, professional advancement opportunities and prosocial rule-breaking among public servants in Greece
Controlling Institutions
Quid pro Quo
Electoral misgovernance cycles
How party linkages shape austerity politics
Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis
A historical institutionalist explanation of the EU's responses to the euro area financial crisis
Providing political leadership? Three case studies on Germany's ambiguous role in the eurozone crisis
Conditionality, Democracy and Institutional Weakness
Stateless Euro
Public Goods or Political Pandering
The 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections
Lessons from the Greek crisis
Bargaining power and negotiation strategy
Politics at the Water’s Edge
Bargaining Power and Negotiation Tactics
Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining
Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation
Rationalist explanations for war
The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa
| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,5 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2024 (7) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |