Influence in the EU
Measuring Mutual Support
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071138 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marco Fantini (European Commission), Klaas Staal (0000-0003-3719-8594, Karlstad Business School Karlstad University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 212-229 |
| Publication date | 2017-08-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/jcms.12586 |
| OpenAlex | W2746749358 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 28 |
We assess a country's influence on decision‐making in the Council not merely on the basis of the number of its votes, but based on a novel measure that also takes into account the voting behaviour of other countries. A country that is likely to receive support from other countries will be more influential than a country with more votes, but which tends to be isolated in its policy preferences. We apply the methodology to a novel dataset and use it to assess whether changes in voting weights in the Lisbon Treaty influence the odds of whether countries get what they want when decisions are taken in the Council. We show that large Member States are less successful in getting support from others for their positions, while the changes in voting weights increase large Member States' influence, but statistically significant decrease it only for a subgroup of small Member States
Data mining · Demographic economics · Economics · European union · International economics · Logistic regression · Majority rule · Measure (data warehouse · Member states · Odds · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Statistics · Treaty · Voting · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics
The Council of Ministers
A note on voting
Voting power in an ideological spectrum
Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union
The Impossibility of a Preference-Based Power Index
The Possibility of a Preference-Based Power Index
The Division of Labour in Legislative Decision-Making of the Council of the European Union
The impact of the Eastern enlargement on the decision-making capacity of the European Union
Who Decides in the Council of the European Union
Voting in the Council of the European Union after the 2004 Enlargement
Actor alignments in European Union decision making
Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work
Domestic adjustment costs, interdependence and dissent in the C ouncil of the E uropean U nion
The Contested Council
Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis
When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly
A Priori versus Empirical Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers
Applying Ideal Point Estimation Methods to the Council of Ministers
Why Unanimity in the Council
Issue-specific policy-positions and voting in the Council
The Voting Power Approach
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,14 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2019 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |