When Fairness is Unfair
Norm Abandonment in Bargaining and Its Implications for Peace Negotiations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071521 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Vinh Pham (0009-0002-3052-8589, Waseda University), Linjia Jiang (0009-0009-8707-4013, Comture Corporation), Yoshio Kamijo (0000-0002-2184-9594, Waseda University) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 70 |
| Issue | 2-3 |
| Pages | 261-286 |
| Publication date | 2025-07-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027251356643 |
| OpenAlex | W4411984672 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 57 |
Fairness perceptions can significantly impact the instigation and resolution of conflicts. To examine how fairness norms shape agreements, we conduct an experiment, where participants first select a preferred rule between equal division, equal gain, and proportional division. When paired with another sharing the same norm, participants decide whether to adhere to the projected division or negotiate a different outcome. Experimental results reveal that participants renege on the agreement more frequently when allocations are perceived as unfair to the self: high contributors in equal division and low contributors in proportional division. Furthermore, attachment to the initial norm is sturdiest for strict equality and weakest for proportionality. Equal gain, coinciding with the Nash bargaining solution, is the most favored at both preselection and negotiation outcomes. We discuss several applications of our findings in resolving international conflicts
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |