The effect of illusory power in non-zero-sum games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071522 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul G Swingle (McMaster University), Brian D Maclean (McMaster University), Brian Maclean (McMaster University) |
| Year | 1971 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 513-522 |
| Publication date | 1971-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277101500408 |
| OpenAlex | W2007402999 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 7 |
Considerable controversy still exists regarding the concepts of and power in the conflict literature. The simple existence of a punitive capability by one or both parties to a gaming conflict has been defined as (Deutsch and Krauss, 1960). Others have maintained, however, that the term threat should be reserved for situations in which the party possessing the punitive capability is perceived by the second party as having the intention of using the capability should certain conditions prevail. The intention to use, or more precisely the lack of intention to preclude use of, the capability is typically related to the behavior of the second party to the conflict. Thus, offensive deterrence is the perceived intention to use the capability in counterretaliation. Defensive deterrence, on the other hand, is the perceived intent to retaliate. The credibility of threat, however, depends solely upon the perceived probability that one will experience the punishment. This perceived probability is influenced by a wide range of factors including the threatener's history of fulfilled promises to harm, the error in the system (accidental execution of the capability), the cost to the threatener of use of the capability, and the extent of the
Econometrics · Economics · Game theory · Linguistics · Mathematical economics · Physics · Positive economics · Power (physics · Quantum mechanics · Zero (linguistics · Zero-sum game · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,02 |
| Citation span | 1978 - 1978 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |