Competing Norms of Distribution in Coalition Games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071523 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Byron M Roth (0000-0002-3366-9080, Department of Psychology Dowling College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1979 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 513-537 |
| Publication date | 1979-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277902300306 |
| OpenAlex | W2132380180 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 22 |
Most social psychological studies of coalition formation involve the assignment to subjects of different quantities of some resource such as weights or votes. Most coalition theories assume that these resources, or "sources of entitlement" as they are referred to here, call into play appropriate norms of distribution (such as parity) which determine the outcome of the game. There has been, however, little work on the effect of the competition of such norms when individuals may make competing claims on the basis of the possession of different sources of entitlement. The research reported here represents an initial attempt to assess such effects. Subjects in a three-person coalition game were asked to act as representatives of groups which differed in size, the collective effort of its members, and its ability to increase the total payoff to a coalition. Two studies are reported; one employed responses to a questionnaire, and the second involved role-playing by participants. The results of the questionnaire supported the hypothesis of strength in weakness for the effort and size factors, but those results did not, in general, carry over into the experimental bargaining. In neither study did weakness in economic entitlement benefit a subject. It was concluded that the strength in weakness hypothesis has limited applicability and seems to apply only in those cases where an actor's weakness can be effectively translated into a benefit for a potential partner. Minimum resource theory was seen to be a special case of that hypothesis
Distribution (mathematics · Economics · Entitlement (fair division · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Possession (linguistics · Stochastic game · Weakness · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
The theory of political coalitions.
Two Against One
Games for Society, Business and War
Sex Roles in a Three-Person Game
Coalitions in the Triad
The effects of probability of future success on coalition formation
Coalition formation as a function of differences in resources
Social contacts in a three-person "political convention" situation
Achievement, nurturance, and competition in male and female triads
Coalitions in the triad
Effects of experience and bargaining restrictions on coalition formation
A Theory of Coalition Formation
An Experimental Study of Coalitions in the Triad
A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad
Achievement and nurturance in triads varying in power distribution
Bargaining in a Three-Person Game
Further Development of a Theory of Coalitions in the Triad
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,03 |
| Citation span | 1987 - 1987 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |