Equivalence and Stooge Strategies in Zero-Sum Games

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10071699
AutoresJohn Fox (0000-0002-1196-8012, Mental Health Research Institute University of Michigan), Melvin Guyer (Mental Health Research Institute University of Michigan)
Ano1973
Volume17
Fascículo3
Páginas513-533
Data de publicação1973-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/002200277301700306
OpenAlexW2085010502
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas11

Classes of two-person zero-sum games termed "equivalent games" are defined. These are games with identical value and identical optimal mixed-strategies but with different matrix entries and thus different opportunities for exploiting a nonrational opponent. An experiment was conducted to investigate the strategy-choice behavior of subjects playing pairs of these "equivalent games." Also investigated was the extent to which subjects would exploit a programmed stooge as a function of the degree to which the stooge departed from his optimal strategy mix. The results indicated that subjects learned to exploit the nonrational play of the stooge opponent. The game factor, on the other hand, seemed to have no significant effect upon the strategy-choice behavior of the players. The implications of these results are discussed in light of questions raised by previous research on decision-making in 2 x 2 zero-sum games

Adversary · Computer security · Discrete mathematics · Equivalence (formal languages · Exploit · Function (biology · Game theory · Linguistics · Mathematical economics · Statistics · Strategy · Zero (linguistics · Zero-sum game · Behavioral and Psychological Studies · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology