Hanging Together or Hanged Separately
The Strategic Power of Coalitions where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071763 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kai A Konrad (0000-0002-2225-2271, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Munich, Germany, corresponding author), Thomas R Cusack (Social Science Research Center Berlin, Berlin, Germany) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 920-940 |
| Publication date | 2013-05-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002713487319 |
| OpenAlex | W3125439552 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 25 |
What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared to negotiating as a stand-alone player and reduces the demands of the outside player. Group membership lends additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may harm also the intergovernmental group. We uncover the role of preference alignment and preference independence between members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis, we also distinguish between coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always perfectly aligned
Bargaining power · Dilemma · Economics · Group (periodic table · Group Decision Making · Harm · Independence (probability theory · Market economy · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Preference · Unanimity · Welfare · Economic Policies and Impacts · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Psychology · Social Psychology
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Reevaluating Alliance Reliability
The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited
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| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |