Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe
North and Weingast Revisited
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23320613 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Stasavage (0000-0001-9964-716X, London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 155-186 |
| Publication date | 2002-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Law Economics and Organization (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1465-7341 • E-ISSN: 8756-6222 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jleo/18.1.155 |
| OpenAlex | W1997529283 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 61 |
| References cited | 25 |
This article proposes a revision to existing arguments that institutions of limited government (characterized by multiple veto points) improve the ability of governments to credibly commit. Focusing on the issue of sovereign indebtedness, I present a simple framework for analyzing credibility problems in an economy divided between owners of land and owners of capital. I then argue that establishing multiple veto points can improve credibility, but whether this takes place depends upon the structure of partisan interests in a society, on the existence of cross‐issue coalitions, and on the extent to which management of government debt is delegated. I develop several propositions to take account of these factors and evaluate them with historical evidence from eighteenth century England and France. The results show that incorporating these additional factors can help to explain a broader range of phenomena than is accounted for in existing studies.
Capital (architecture) · Commit · Credibility · Debt · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Macroeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Sovereign debt · Sovereignty · Veto · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Historical Economic and Social Studies · Law
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| Unique citing works | 61 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,44 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2025 (25) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 53 |