Terrorism Works, for its Supporters
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071790 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew J Coe (0000-0003-4986-1242, Vanderbilt University), Peter Schram (0000-0001-6404-2259, Vanderbilt University), Heesun Yoo (0000-0003-3974-9345, Emory University) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 955-979 |
| Publication date | 2024-09-28 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027241283824 |
| OpenAlex | W4402939924 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 37 |
Empirical studies have shown that terrorists’ policy goals are rarely achieved, leading some to conclude that terrorism doesn’t work. We theorize that terrorism can work, but for its supporters rather than for the terrorists themselves. Because supporters are willing to contribute resources to a terrorist organization, thereby increasing the organization’s ability to launch attacks, this can coerce the targeted government to revise its policies in accordance with the supporters’ preferences. Targeted governments may respond with concessions in order to erode support and thereby render the terrorists easier to defeat. Support can be rational even when supporters’ ideal policies are closer to those of the government than to those of the terrorists. We examine Hamas and the Provisional IRA, generally regarded as failures. We show that targeted governments sometimes made concessions that placated supporters but not the terrorists, and that this was followed by reduced support for and occurrence of violence
Criminology · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Terrorism · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Militant Competition
Dying to Win
Why civil resistance works
How Terrorist Groups End
Explaining Suicide Terrorism
Terrorism, Wealth, and Delegation
Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism
Does terrorism work? A history
Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom
Why Terrorism Does Not Work
What Terrorists Really Want
Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations
Terrorism in the Context of Civil War
Counterterrorism Policy in an Uncertain World
Sowing Dragon's Teeth
Mowing the grass
Rational Overreaction to Terrorism
Managing Insurgency
Is Terrorism Really a Weapon of the Weak? Debunking the Conventional Wisdom
The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations
Don't Bite the Hand that Feeds
Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes
Explaining Terrorism
Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups
The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited
Hassling
State Support for Rebels and Interstate Bargaining
The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence
Who voted for peace? Public support for the 1998 Northern Ireland agreement
Groupthink and Terrorist Radicalization
Who Were the Volunteers?1The Shifting Sociological and Operational Profile of 1240 Provisional Irish Republican Army Members
The Irish republican army
The provisional Irish republican army
Votes and violence
The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |