Peter Schram
Biographic Data
| ID | 4372118 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Peter Schram |
| GIVEN NAMES | Peter |
| FAMILY NAME | Schram |
| SIGNATURE | SCHRAM P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Vanderbilt University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6404-2259 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 37 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Uncertainty in crisis bargaining with multiple policy options
Formal models commonly characterize interstate bargaining as dichotomous, ending in either war or peace. But there are many forms of coercion—including supporting rebel groups, sanctions, and cyberattacks. How does the availability of intermediate policy options affect the incidence of war and peace? We present an analysis of crisis bargaining models with intermediate policy options that challenges conventional results about the relationship betw…
Conflicts that Leave Something to Chance
The development of nuclear weapons added a new dimension to conventional conflict: the possibility that it could inadvertently escalate into a nuclear exchange. How does this relationship between conventional war and nuclear escalation shape deterrence? I present a formal model of deterrence and arming. The novelty here is that investing in conventional capabilities has a direct effect on the balance of power but also an indirect effect on confli…
Terrorism Works, for its Supporters
Empirical studies have shown that terrorists’ policy goals are rarely achieved, leading some to conclude that terrorism doesn’t work. We theorize that terrorism can work, but for its supporters rather than for the terrorists themselves. Because supporters are willing to contribute resources to a terrorist organization, thereby increasing the organization’s ability to launch attacks, this can coerce the targeted government to revise its policies i…
The Shadow of Deterrence: Why Capable Actors Engage in Contests Short of War
Defense policy makers have become increasingly concerned about conflict in the “gray zone” between peace and war. Such conflicts are often interpreted as cases of deterrence failures, as new technologies or tactics—from cyber operations to “little green men”—seem to increase the effectiveness of low-intensity aggression. However, gray zone conflict could also be a case of deterrence success, where challengers adopt a constrained form of aggressio…
When Capabilities Backfire: How Improved Hassling Capabilities Produce Worse Outcomes
I formalize interactions between an endogenously rising challenger and a rival defender who can accept the challenger’s rise, go to war before the rise comes to fruition, or degrade the challenger’s growth through low-level conflict operations that I call “hassling.” The novelty here is that the defender has private information about its hassling capabilities; this implies that the challenger does not know how much it can rise without provoking t…
Hassling: How States Prevent a Preventive War
Low‐level military operations outside of war are pervasive in the international system. These activities have been viewed as destabilizing by both academics and policy makers, as miscalculations or missteps in conducting low‐level operations can risk escalation to war. I show the opposite can be true: these operations can prevent escalation to a greater war. I examine a type of low‐level conflict that I call “hassling” in the common framework of …
Managing Insurgency
Why would an insurgent group turn away foreign fighters who volunteered to fight for its cause? To explain variation in foreign fighter usage, I present a novel perspective on what foreign fighters offer to militant groups. Because foreign fighters possess a different set of preferences from local fighters, integrated teams of foreign and local fighters can self-manage and mitigate the agency problems that are ubiquitous to insurgent groups. Howe…
Hassling: How States Prevent a Preventive War
Low‐level military operations outside of war are pervasive in the international system. These activities have been viewed as destabilizing by both academics and policy makers, as miscalculations or missteps in conducting low‐level operations can risk escalation to war. I show the opposite can be true: these operations can prevent escalation to a greater war. I examine a type of low‐level conflict that I call “hassling” in the common framework of …
The Shadow of Deterrence: Why Capable Actors Engage in Contests Short of War
Defense policy makers have become increasingly concerned about conflict in the “gray zone” between peace and war. Such conflicts are often interpreted as cases of deterrence failures, as new technologies or tactics—from cyber operations to “little green men”—seem to increase the effectiveness of low-intensity aggression. However, gray zone conflict could also be a case of deterrence success, where challengers adopt a constrained form of aggressio…
When Capabilities Backfire: How Improved Hassling Capabilities Produce Worse Outcomes
I formalize interactions between an endogenously rising challenger and a rival defender who can accept the challenger’s rise, go to war before the rise comes to fruition, or degrade the challenger’s growth through low-level conflict operations that I call “hassling.” The novelty here is that the defender has private information about its hassling capabilities; this implies that the challenger does not know how much it can rise without provoking t…
Managing Insurgency
Why would an insurgent group turn away foreign fighters who volunteered to fight for its cause? To explain variation in foreign fighter usage, I present a novel perspective on what foreign fighters offer to militant groups. Because foreign fighters possess a different set of preferences from local fighters, integrated teams of foreign and local fighters can self-manage and mitigate the agency problems that are ubiquitous to insurgent groups. Howe…
Managing Insurgency
Why would an insurgent group turn away foreign fighters who volunteered to fight for its cause? To explain variation in foreign fighter usage, I present a novel perspective on what foreign fighters offer to militant groups. Because foreign fighters possess a different set of preferences from local fighters, integrated teams of foreign and local fighters can self-manage and mitigate the agency problems that are ubiquitous to insurgent groups. Howe…
Hassling: How States Prevent a Preventive War
Low‐level military operations outside of war are pervasive in the international system. These activities have been viewed as destabilizing by both academics and policy makers, as miscalculations or missteps in conducting low‐level operations can risk escalation to war. I show the opposite can be true: these operations can prevent escalation to a greater war. I examine a type of low‐level conflict that I call “hassling” in the common framework of …
When Capabilities Backfire: How Improved Hassling Capabilities Produce Worse Outcomes
I formalize interactions between an endogenously rising challenger and a rival defender who can accept the challenger’s rise, go to war before the rise comes to fruition, or degrade the challenger’s growth through low-level conflict operations that I call “hassling.” The novelty here is that the defender has private information about its hassling capabilities; this implies that the challenger does not know how much it can rise without provoking t…
Terrorism Works, for its Supporters
Empirical studies have shown that terrorists’ policy goals are rarely achieved, leading some to conclude that terrorism doesn’t work. We theorize that terrorism can work, but for its supporters rather than for the terrorists themselves. Because supporters are willing to contribute resources to a terrorist organization, thereby increasing the organization’s ability to launch attacks, this can coerce the targeted government to revise its policies i…
The Shadow of Deterrence: Why Capable Actors Engage in Contests Short of War
Defense policy makers have become increasingly concerned about conflict in the “gray zone” between peace and war. Such conflicts are often interpreted as cases of deterrence failures, as new technologies or tactics—from cyber operations to “little green men”—seem to increase the effectiveness of low-intensity aggression. However, gray zone conflict could also be a case of deterrence success, where challengers adopt a constrained form of aggressio…
Uncertainty in crisis bargaining with multiple policy options
Formal models commonly characterize interstate bargaining as dichotomous, ending in either war or peace. But there are many forms of coercion—including supporting rebel groups, sanctions, and cyberattacks. How does the availability of intermediate policy options affect the incidence of war and peace? We present an analysis of crisis bargaining models with intermediate policy options that challenges conventional results about the relationship betw…
Conflicts that Leave Something to Chance
The development of nuclear weapons added a new dimension to conventional conflict: the possibility that it could inadvertently escalate into a nuclear exchange. How does this relationship between conventional war and nuclear escalation shape deterrence? I present a formal model of deterrence and arming. The novelty here is that investing in conventional capabilities has a direct effect on the balance of power but also an indirect effect on confli…
Political science (7 works) · Law (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (5 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Law and economics (3 works)