Fairness and the Dynamic Stability of Institutions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071866 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard B Sherman (corresponding author), Richard Sherman (Department of Political Science Syracuse University) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 297-319 |
| Publication date | 2001-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002701045003003 |
| OpenAlex | W2130225300 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 40 |
Rawlsian fairness is motivated by two devices: the veil of ignorance that separates individuals from knowledge of their ultimate positions in society and the necessity of irrevocable consent. After making constitutional choices, individuals must live with the consequences of the distributive principles they have chosen; they cannot withdraw from society. Yet, in many problems of institutional choice, people can withdraw from cooperative arrangements after the allocation of benefits has been made. The relationship between fairness and stability in general problems of institutional choice is examined. In symmetric problems, fairness maximizes the stability of institutions. When one individual has a higher valued outside option, maximizing institutional stability requires assigning to that individual a correspondingly large share of the benefits of cooperation. An individual for whom the benefits of cooperation are more prone to risk must generally receive a larger share of the benefits of cooperation if institutional stability is to be maximized
Actuarial science · Business · Distributive justice · Distributive property · Economic Justice · Economics · Ignorance · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Public economics · Stability (learning theory · Veil of ignorance · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
Taxation and democracy
Cooperation and Governance in International Trade
Economic Analysis of Property Rights
Information and Legislative Organization
Economic Behavior and Institutions
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
The Bargaining Problem
Corporate culture and economic theory
The political consequences of electoral laws
The Economic Theory of Social Institutions
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
The Origins of Alliances
Of Rule and Revenue
Japan's Political Marketplace
Making Votes Count
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement
The World Trading System
Aggressive Unilateralism
The Nature of the Firm
Negotiating the Single European Act
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy
Alliance Formation and War
The demand for international regimes
Anarchy and the limits of cooperation
Spontaneous Order
The Moral Sense
Bargaining in Legislatures
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation
Guns, Butter, and Anarchy
Maastricht and the Social Protocol
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |