The Recognition Controversy
Anglo-American Relations in China, 1949
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10072906 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lanxin Xiang (corresponding author), Lanxin Xiang Lanxin Xiang |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 319-343 |
| Publication date | 1992-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Contemporary History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0094 • E-ISSN: 1461-7250 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200949202700206 |
| OpenAlex | W2017165367 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
Anglo-American differences in China in 1949 are often regarded as the result of misunderstandings and lack of communication. In fact, for the first time since the end of the war, the two governments had engaged in frequent consultations over major policy issues in the Far East. Yet the more Washington was willing to explain its position, the farther apart the two were driven. This suggests that the conflict was deeply rooted, more so than many scholars have thought, a view that is reinforced when the split is seen in the context of the strong AngloAmerican differences evident from 1945 on.1 There has long been a 'Lost Chance' thesis among American historians, according to which a chance was lost in 1949 to compromise with the Chinese communists. The key evidence from the American side seems to be Secretary of State Dean Acheson's interest in forging a 'Chinese Tito'. It is widely believed that, had Acheson had his way, the history of Sino-US relations would have taken a different course.2 My study indicates that Acheson was never committed to pursuing a 'Chinese Tito' policy. On the contrary, Acheson, along with President Truman, was consistent in taking a tough line with Peking. It is true that Acheson and his advisers had frequently referred to such a tactical hard line during 1949, especially when battling with a hostile Congress. Archival evidence makes it difficult to prove that this was a consistent policy despite its rhetorical value. More important, most scholars of the Lost Chance thesis seem to have de-emphasized Acheson's insistence on China's honouring 'international obligations', including most of the Sino-US bilateral treaties, as preconditions for recognition. Since the United States had associated itself with the losing side in the Chinese civil war, it is hard to believe that Acheson had harboured any great hope of success in his tactical
China · Political science · Australian History and Society · Commonwealth, Australian Politics and Federalism · History · Law · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,14 |
| Citation span | 1998 - 2021 (24) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |