The Myth of Strategic Bombing
Israeli Deep-Penetration Air Raids in the War of Attrition, 1969-70
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10076659 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov Bar‐siman‐tov (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1984 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 549-570 |
| Publication date | 1984-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Contemporary History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0094 • E-ISSN: 1461-7250 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200948401900308 |
| OpenAlex | W2044605940 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
The assertion that strategic bombing is ineffective in determining the military or political outcome of a war has been made repeatedly during the past forty years. For the most part, this assertion has been limited to the experiences of major powers in a total war (e.g. Germany, Britain and the United States in the second world war) or the American experience in a limited war (Korea and Vietnam).1 The effectiveness of strategic bombing as practised by a small state in a limited local war has not been examined until now. This paper proposes to focus on such a situation by analyzing Israel's decision to use strategic bombing during the 1969-70 War of Attrition the first conflict in the cycle of Arab-Israeli violence in which one party initiated strategic bombing, and in which military intervention by a superpower (the Soviet Union) subsequently occurred.2 The focus of this research is an analysis of the decision-making process that led to the strategic bombing; an evaluation of the effectiveness of strategic bombing both in terms of Israeli policy-makers' aims and the results and consequences of the action; an examination of the influence of superpower constraints on the effectiveness of a strategic bombing in limited local war; and suggestion of a new consideration concerning the use of strategic bombing as a bargaining means, rather than as a method to bring a war to a decisive end. The War of Attrition, initiated by Egypt in March 1969, was a limited land war aimed at compelling Israel to withdraw from the Sinai. Egypt's military strategy consisted of massive artillery bombing of Israel's position on the Suez Canal front and occasional
Aeronautics · Ancient history · Attrition · Mythology · Operations research · Penetration (warfare · Political science · Spanish Civil War · Strategic bombing · Classics · Engineering · Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics · History · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies · Law · Medicine
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,15 |
| Citation span | 1992 - 2023 (32) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |