The rational weakness of strong ties
Failure of group solidarity in a highly cohesive group of rational agents
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10142226 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andreas Flache (0000-0002-8276-8819, Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 189-216 |
| Publication date | 2002-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Mathematical Sociology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-250X • E-ISSN: 1545-5874 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00222500212988 |
| OpenAlex | W2113244506 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 17 |
| References cited | 38 |
Recent research (Flache, 1996; Flache and Macy, 1996) suggests a "weakness of strong ties." Cohesive social networks may undermine group solidarity, rather than sustain it. In the original analysis, simulations showed that adaptive actors learn cooperation in bilateral exchanges faster than cooperation in more complex group exchanges, favoring ties at the expense of the common good. This article uses game theory to demonstrate that cognitive simplicity is not a scope condition for the result. The game theoretical analysis identifies a new condition for the failure of group solidarity in a cohesive group. Task uncertainty may make rational cooperation increasingly inefficient in common good production. Accordingly, rational actors may increasingly sacrifice benefits from common good production in order to maintain social ties, as their dependence on peer approval rises
Economics · Epistemology · Group (periodic table · Interpersonal ties · Order (exchange · Political science · Scope (computer science · Simplicity · Solidarity · Weakness · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Psychology · Social Psychology
Altruism and Prosocial Behavior, Sociology of
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| Unique citing works | 17 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,81 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2026 (22) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 17 |