Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

The Impartial, Anonymous, and Neutral Culture Model

A Probability Model for Sampling Public Preference Structures

Bibliographic Data

ID10142649
AuthorsÖmer Eğecioǧlu (0000-0002-6070-761X, University of California, Santa Barbara, corresponding author), Ayça Ebru Giritligil (0000-0002-9188-9305, Istanbul Bilgi University)
Year2013
Volume37
Issue4
Pages203-222
Publication date2013-09-17
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Mathematical Sociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-250X • E-ISSN: 1545-5874
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0022250x.2011.597012
OpenAlexW2016900452
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited8

We introduce a new probability model, namely Impartial, Anonymous and Neutral Culture model (IANC), for sampling public preferences concerning a given set of alternatives. IANC treats public preferences through a class of preference profiles named roots, where both names of the voters and of the alternatives are immaterial. The general framework along with the theoretical formulation through group actions, an exact formula for the number of roots, and the description of a symbolic algebra package that allows for the generation of roots uniformly are presented. In order to be able to obtain uniform distribution of roots for large electorate size and high number of alternatives which lead to combinatorial explosions, the machinery we developed involves elements of symmetric functions and an application of the Dixon-Wilf algorithm. Using Monte-Carlo methods, the model we develop allows for a testbed that can be used to answer various questions about the properties and behaviors of anonymous and neutral social choice rules for large parameters. As applications of the method, the results of two Monte-Carlo experiments are presented: the likelihood of the existence of Condorcet winners, and the probability of Condorcet and Plurality rules to choose the same winner

Preference · Sampling (signal processing · Statistics · Telecommunications · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics

  • The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions

    Open Access•Alexander Karpov•Social Choice and Welfare•2020

  • Flexible representative democracy

    Open Access•Ben Abramowitz, Nicholas Mattei•Social Choice and Welfare•2025

  • Evaluating fairness of voting systems

    Open Access•Virochan Pandit, Joseph Cutrone•Theory and Decision•2025

  • Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles

    Open Access•William V Gehrlein, Peter C Fishburn•Public Choice•1976

  • Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity

    Open Access•Dominique Lepelley, Fabrice Valognes•Public Choice•2003

Citations per year0.5
Citation span2020 - 2025 (6)
Highly citedNo

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae