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Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles

Bibliographic Data

ID10933301
AuthorsWilliam V Gehrlein (0000-0001-5974-8791), Peter C Fishburn (Pennsylvania State University)
Year1976
Volume26
Issue1
Pages1-18
Publication date1976-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePublic Choice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/bf01725789
OpenAlexW1973964636
LanguageEN
Citations received35
References cited26

Condorcet method · Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Preference · Public finance · Voting · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics

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Unique citing works35
Citations per year0.73
Citation span1978 - 2026 (49)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 35

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