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The superdominance relation, the positional winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet

Bibliographic Data

ID6297967
AuthorsRaúl Pérez-Fernández (0000-0001-6966-1681, Ghent University, corresponding author), Bernard De Baets (0000-0002-3876-620X, Ghent University)
Year2019
Volume31
Issue1
Pages46-65
Publication date2019-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951629818809417
OpenAlexW2902719336
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited31

The field of social choice dates back to the eighteenth century, when Borda and Condorcet started a never-ending discussion about the use of either positional or pairwise information. Three centuries later, after countless axiomatic characterizations of voting rules, impossibility theorems and many other study subjects, researchers still debate whether positional information is really sensitive to manipulation or pairwise information disregards the transitivity of voters’ preferences. In a previous paper, we introduced the notions of supercovering relation and pairwise winner, which resulted in a meeting point for both points of view of the theory of social choice. In this paper, we continue this direction and propose the notions of superdominance relation and positional winner that will prove to be the alter egos of the supercovering relation and the pairwise winner when positional information (rather than pairwise information) is considered. Moreover, we analyse a new interesting choice set: the unsuperdominated set

Arrow's impossibility theorem · Axiom · Combinatorics · Condorcet method · Data mining · Field (mathematics · Impossibility · Mathematical economics · Pairwise comparison · Political science · Preference · Preference relation · Relation (database · Set (abstract data type · Social choice theory · Statistics · Transitive relation · Voting · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Artificial Intelligence

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    Open Access•D Marc Kilgour, Jean-Charles Grégoire et al.•Social Choice and Welfare•2022

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Unique citing works2
Citations per year0.5
Citation span2022 - 2025 (4)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2

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